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Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation
Heidi Li Feldman*
The task before us is more daunting still when the dispute
concerns matters at the very cutting edge of scientific research,
where fact meets theory and certainty dissolves into probability.
As the record in this case illustrates, scientists often have
vigorous and sincere disagreements as to what research
methodology is proper, what should be accepted as sufficient
proof for the existence of a 'fact," and whether information
derived by a particular method can tell us anything useful about
the subject under study.
-Judge Alex Kozinski1
I. Introduction
Critics of the tort system have condemned courts for their alleged
leniency in admitting scientific expert testimony, especially in mass
exposure litigation. Claiming that this has resulted in an epidemic of "junk
science" in the courtroom,2 these commentators have urged a more
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1986, Brown University; J.D. 1990,
Ph.D. (Philosophy) 1993, University of Michigan. Thanks to Terry Sandalow, Jeff Lehman, Jim
Joyce, J. Subramanyam, Kent Syverud, Rebecca Eisenberg, Kyle Logue, Steve Croley, William Miller,
Richard Lempert, Eileen John, Chris Whitman, James Boyd White, Sam Gross, Fritz Juenger, Peter
Steiner, Avery Katz, and Robert Harris. Thanks to the participants in a University of Pennsylvania
Law School faculty workshop at which an earlier version of this paper was presented. Thanks to Sam
Feder and Robert Tierney for able research assistance.
1. Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995).
2. See PETER W. HUBER, GALILmO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 2 (1993).
Huber's views have influenced commentators and courts. See, e.g., Stuart v. United States, 23 F.3d
1483, 1486 (9th Cir.) (criticizing a trial judge for "intemperate bench behavior" because the judge
quoted from Galileo's Revenge during the trial), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 357 (1994); Antevski v.
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 4 F.3d 537, 541 & n.3 (7th Cir. 1993) (upholding exclusion of
plaintiff's expert testimony that the Audi 5000 automobile unexpectedly accelerates and citing Huber's
criticism of such claims); Carter v. Great Am. Ins., No. Civ. A. 94-0139, 1994 WL 374283, at *1
(E.D. La. July 1, 1994) (citing Huber in granting defendant's motion to exclude plaintiff's expert
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scientific approach to admissibility, intimating that employing more
scientific standards would exclude scientific evidence favorable to
plaintiffs, thereby demonstrating to factfinders that litigated substances are
in fact safe or at least not unsafe.3
In 1993, the Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,' articulating a new set of standards for admitting
scientific expert witness testimony. This Article argues that just as
conservatives have urged, Daubert incorporates into law a scientific attitude
toward selecting scientific testimony. Contrary to conservatives' expecta-
tions, however, this new, more scientific approach to admissibility will not
typically lead to greater certainty at trial about the causal powers of
substances litigated in mass exposure cases. Rather, at the time of
litigation, a reasonable factfinder will often be left in a state of strong
uncertainty about general causation, unable to conclude that it is more
likely than not that a litigated substance is safe, or that it is more likely
than not that the substance is unsafe.
In this Article, I argue that the Daubert Court adopted an approach to
determining the admissibility of scientific opinion that reflects scientists'
own approach to deciding which information to consider when deciding
questions of scientific fact.' In fact, I argue that the Daubert approach
reflects the scientific one more closely than the Court may even have
realized. 6 Yet, whatever the wisdom of bringing legal standards for
admissibility in line with scientific standards for respectable science, doing
so forces to the forefront a problem that lawyers, judges, legislatures, and
citizens have not confronted squarely: the problem of how to satisfactorily
dispose of lawsuits involving thousands of plaintiffs in the face of genuine
scientific uncertainty regarding the toxicity or safety of the litigated
substance or product. The more closely legal standards hew to scientific
ones for selecting information worth considering, the more often it will be
apparent that science is severely uncertain about the causal effects of the
testimony); Maiorana v. National Gypsum Co. (In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 827 F.
Supp. 1014, 1031 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing Huber to justify close scrutiny of plaintiffs' scientific experts
in an asbestos products liability action), rev'd, 52 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1995); Hutchison v. American
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 514 N.W.2d 882, 888 (Iowa 1994) (admitting expert testimony explicitly in
opposition to Huber's position, which the court cites); Nicholas Wade, Method and Madness, N.Y.
TIMES, July 24, 1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 10 (criticizing courts for taking an unscientific approach to
scientific matters of fact).
3. See, e.g., HUBER, supra note 2, at 15-17 (describing a decrease in the stringency of
admissibility rules as a boon for plaintiffs and their lawyers); Kenneth R. Foster et al., A Legal
Perspective, in PHANTOM RISK 35-36 (Kenneth R. Foster et al. eds., 1993) (arguing that uncertain
science fuels speculative litigation and that tentative studies benefit plaintiffs even though the studies
are not determinative).
4. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
5. See infra subpart 11(A).
6. See nfra Part M.
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substances and products that figure so prominently in contemporary tort
litigation.' When scientists are severely uncertain about the general causal
powers of a substance, legal factfinders will lack a basis either for
concluding that the substance is more likely than not to cause harm to
humans or for concluding that it is more likely than not to be safe for
humans.
To demonstrate the point, I consider the state of current scientific
understanding of the effects of silicone breast implants in the context of
assessing the admissibility of scientific testimony in a hypothetical breast
implant lawsuit.' Then, I explain the role of certainty about causation in
tort litigation in order to consider how the tort system might respond to
severe uncertainty about causation, particularly in mass exposure litigation.
I conclude that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to respond
satisfactorily to severe uncertainty about causation without resolving certain
fundamental substantive issues that lie at the heart of tort law. I also
conclude that at least in mass exposure litigation, we need to mute the
impact of strong uncertainty about causation. I briefly survey three
possible revisions of the current system to illustrate how the problem of
recurrent strong uncertainty requires us to reconsider traditional tort goals,
consider new alternatives, and ascertain how to accomplish our chosen
ends.9
Now that the Supreme Court has adopted a sensible approach to the
admissibility of scientific evidence, it is time for scholars and other
commentators to shift their attention to more substantive issues, such as the
regulation of products whose causal powers are ill-understood and expen-
sive to ascertain, and the compensation of people with injuries of unknown
origin."°
II. Daubert
Daubert conjoins the issues considered in this Article: the question of
admissibility standards for scientific expert witness testimony and the role
of science in mass exposure litigation. Daubert itself was part of the mass
exposure litigation involving the anti-nausea drug Bendectin. From 1956
to 1983, Merrell Dow marketed Bendectin as a cure for morning sickness
7. See infra subpart Im(B).
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See infra Part VI.
10. Unfortunately, scholars have already begun to criticize the Daubert standards, sustaining the
academic focus on admissibility. See, e.g., Margaret G. Farrell, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Epistemiology and Legal Process, 15 CARDozo L. REV. 2183 (1994) (arguing
that Daubert is internally inconsistent); Joseph Sanders, Scientific Validity, Admissibility, and Mass
Torts After Daubert, 78 MINN. L. RsV. 1387, 1391 (1994) (arguing that Daubert's guidelines are too
vague to be useful in assessing the validity of scientific testimony).
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during pregnancy.11 Since 1977, there have been approximately thirty
trials litigating the question of whether Bendectin causes birth defects in the
offspring of women who took the drug. 2 Of these cases, only one verdict
has been returned in favor of the plaintiff and survived appeal. 3 In
general, the trend in Bendectin litigation has been toward summary judg-
ment,14 resulting in fewer trials. The main explanation for this trend is that
during the lifetime of the litigation, an unusually quick and extensive
scientific consensus emerged to the effect that Bendectin does not cause
birth defects. 5 This meant that the later Bendectin cases, including
Daubert, presented ripe targets for complaints about the use of "junk
science" to create spurious issues of fact on the causation question. 6
Plaintiff Daubert sought to introduce scientific expert testimony to
support the claim that Bendectin caused his limb-reduction birth defects.17
The testimony in question consisted of expert opinions based on animal
tests, chemical structure analyses, and the reanalysis of previous epide-
miological studies. 8 The trial court excluded the testimony, determined
that without it the plaintiff could not meet the burden of proof on the
causation question, and awarded summary judgment for Merrell Dow. 9
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the trial court's rulings,' relying
11. Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 301, 317-19 (1992).
12. Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin
Cases, 46 STAN. L. RV. 1, 4-5 (1993).
13. Id. at 29. The case is Oxendinev. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 506 A.2d 1100 (D.C.
1986). For a full discussion of the status of Oxendine as of late 1993, see Sanders, supra note 12, at
29 & nn.139-40.
14. See, e.g., Herring v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 896 F.2d 1383 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(table); Lee v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1027 (W.D. Tenn. 1991), aff'd, 961 F.2d 1577
(6th Cir.) (table), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 197 (1992); Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
736 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Ky. 1990), afftd, 959 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 84
(1992); DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 131 F.R.D. 71 (D.NJ. 1989), rev'd, 911 F.2d 941
(3d Cir. 1990), summary judgment granted on remand, 791 F. Supp. 1042 (D.N.J. 1992),aff'dvwthout
opinion, 6 F.3d 778 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 691 (1994); see also Hull v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 28 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (granting summary judgment for Merrell
Dow). For a discussion of the grounds for summaryjudgment in the Bendectin cases, see Samuel R.
Gross, Substance and Form in Scientific Evidence: What Daubert Didn't Do (1994) (unpublished
manuscript).
15. See Sanders, supra note 12, at 18-27 (surveying the published studies on Bendectin and
concluding that there is substantial evidence that it is safe).
16. See HuBmk, supra note 2, at 111-29 (depicting the Bendectin litigation as being whipped up
by lawyers and fueled by bad science); see also Louis Lasagna & Sheila R. Shulman, Bendectin and
the Language of Causation, in PHANTOM RISK, supra note 3, at 101, 101-05 (outlining the results of
various studies failing to show any significant elevation of malformations in infants exposed to
Bendectin).
17. Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 573 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
18. Id. at 574.
19. Id. at 575-76.
20. Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991).
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upon an admissibility rule formulated in Frye v. United States,21 the most
prominent appellate decision regarding admissibility of scientific
testimony.' When the Supreme Court in Daubert reviewed the question
of the admissibility of the plaintiff's evidence, it ruled that the Federal
Rules of Evidence superseded previous appellate holdings regarding the
standards for admitting scientific expert testimony and replaced the Frye
rule with new admissibility standards.'
The Supreme Court's ruling in Daubert accomplishes two things.
First, it strips Frye of its authority. Second, it provides the basis for a new
set of admissibility standards based on Federal Rule of Evidence 702. In
this Part, I explain why the shift from Frye to Daubert is a shift toward a
more scientific approach to admissibility.
A. The Frye Rule
In Frye, the D.C. Circuit held that scientific expert testimony is
admissible only if it is based on techniques generally accepted within the
relevant scientific community.' Over the years, the Frye rule attracted
much scholarly attention, most of it critical.' Lower courts interpreted
its general acceptance standard more and less expansively,' with some
21. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
22. For a discussion of the Frye rule, see infra subpart 1(A).
23. Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2793-96 (1993). On remand,
applying Daubert, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's original grant of summary judgment
to the defendants. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1322 (9th Cir. 1995).
Although the appellate court expressed unease about judicial competence in applying Daubert, id. at
1315-16, it applied the decision quite ably. Following the Supreme Court's guidelines, see infra
subpart 11(B), the court ruled the plaintiff's expert testimony inadmissible. Interestingly, the Ninth
Circuit opinion repeatedly alluded to the problem specified in this Article: recurrent strong uncertainty
about causation. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1313-14; see infra subpart M1(B).
24. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
25. See, e.g., Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595,
630, 629-30 (1988) (arguing that Frye should be used to determine only the validity of scientific
principles, not the reliability of scientific "devices or techniques"); Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility
of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197,
1205-28 (1980) (arguing that Frye is difficult to apply, obscures issues, and produces undesirable
outcomes); Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances
Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 643, 660-61
(1992) (criticizing Judge Weinstein's screening, based onFrye, of expert witnesses in theAgent Orange
case); Roger S. Hanson, James Alphonzo Frye is Sixty-Five Years Old; Should He Retire?, 16 W. ST.
U. L. RE v. 357, 368-69 (1989) ("[A] slavish adherence to 'neutral' scientists to show 'general
acceptance in the scientific community' may defeat admission in a Frye jurisdiction to a new scientific
technique which may be valid and reliable."); Edward 1. Imwinkelried, The "Bases" of Expert
Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1, 25, 23-25 (1988)
(arguing that Frye should not be applied to make admissibility decisions based "on the specific facts
in the pending case"); Andre A. Moenssens, Polygraph Test Results Meet Standards for Admissibility
as Evidence, in LEGAL ADMISSIBIITY OF THE POLYGRAPH 14, 19, 19-21 (Norman Ansley ed., 1975)
(labeling Frye "archaic").
26. Restrictive courts increased Frye's stringency in a number of ways. Some interpreted the
relevant community of scientists broadly, thereby requiring extensive acceptance. See, e.g., People
Texas Law Review [Vol. 74:1
circuits eventually rejecting it altogether.27 As scientific opinion came to
play an important role in high-profile, high-impact tort litigation, however,
some scholars and courts began to call for a recommitment to Frye,
interpreted so as to restrict the range of scientific opinion admitted in the
courtroom. 8
If we grant that when a legal outcome turns on a question of scientific
fact, it makes sense for the legal factfinder to consider information
scientists would think relevant, we can appreciate the initial attractiveness
of the Frye rule.29 If scientists thought that the only research relevant to
v. King, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478,488 (Ct. App. 1968) (holdingvoiceprintidentification inadmissible because
it was not "generally recognized by the scientific disciplines in the related fields of speech, phonetics,
linguistics and acoustics"). Others required plaintiffs to show that background theory, as well as a
particular technique, enjoyed explicit general acceptance. E.g., United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d
161, 163 n.3 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Finally,
some courts insisted that plaintiffs provide fairly extensive evidence of general acceptance. See, e.g.,
People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1248-51 (Cal. 1976) (finding that neither the testimony of a single
expert nor that of the creator of a technique is sufficient to establish general acceptance);
Commonwealth v. Topa, 369 A.2d 1277, 1282 (Pa. 1977) (holding that at least two experts must
testify to establish general acceptance).
More liberal courts interpreted Frye to impose less stringent requirements. Some courts
described the relevant community more narrowly. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 331 P.2d 251,254
(Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1958) (requiring only that a test "has been generally accepted by those
who would be expected to be familiar with its use"). Other courts did not require acceptance of
background theory. See, e.g., United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 438 (6th Cir. 1970) (upholding
the admission of neutron activation analysis despite the lack of support for the theory underlying the
technique), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971); Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 370, 369-70 (Md. 1978)
(interpreting Frye to demand only "a scientific judgment on the reliability of [a particular] process").
Finally, some courts allowed parties to establish general acceptance on the basis of judicial opinions.
See, e.g., State v. Olderman, 336 N.E.2d 442, 447-48 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975) (looking to other courts'
conclusions to determine the admissibility of a voice exemplar).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985) (rejecting the Frye
test in determining the admissibility of expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness
identifications); United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978) ("Difficulty in applying
the 'Frye' test has hassled a number of courts to its implicit modification."), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1117 (1979).
28. E.g., Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1129-30(9th Cir. 1991);
HUBER, supra note 2, at 14-17, 176-77.
29. Throughout this Article, I assume that it does make sense to present the legal factfinder who
is deciding a question of scientific fact with scientific evidence that scientists would consider relevant.
This assumption, however, is not obviously correct. If the legal factfinder is usually a jury of
laypeople (as it currently is in mass exposure litigation), it might make sense to admit only the scientific
evidence that scientists would think laypeople ought to consider when deciding issues of scientific fact.
Alternatively, if the evidence is to include any relevant science, it might make sense to use a jury of
scientists. I follow other scholars in starting from the position that lay factfinders should consider all
relevant science when deciding issues of scientific fact. See generally HUBER, supra note 2, at 225
(stating that courts achieve an optimal result through a "disciplined pursuit of scientific fact" and "by
affirming true science"); Peter Schuck, Multi-Culturalism Redux: Science, Law, and Politics, 11 YALE
L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 35-40 (1993) (arguing that issues that are essentially scientific, such as causation,
should be decided from a scientific perspective). But see Peter Huber, Safety and the SecondBest: The
Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 329-37 (1985) (arguing
that in mass torts, courts should defer to expert administrative agencies).
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scientific matters of fact was research based on generally accepted
techniques, the Frye rule would fit the bill. This standard of relevance,
however, is too stringent. Although scientists might agree that all research
based on generally accepted techniques is relevant, they would not all agree
that only such research is relevant. When scientists describe the state of
scientific understanding, they draw ideas from the cutting edge as well as
from the bank of established findings. Research based on an innovative
technique, not yet generally accepted, may well be relevant to scientific
inquiry. In fact, a blanket prohibition on testimony based on cutting-edge
techniques, methods, and ideas runs contrary to a scientific approach to
gathering information.0
B. The Daubert Admissibility Standards, in Brief
Concluding that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded earlier
appellate rulings on the admissibility of scientific evidence," the Daubert
Court relied upon Federal Rule of Evidence 702 to develop an account of
how trial courts should decide which scientific opinions to admit and which
to exclude. Rule 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise.32
From the phrase "scientific... knowledge," the Court derived a standard
of reliability.33 To be admissible, scientific testimony must have a
"grounding in the methods and procedures of science," that is, be "derived
by the scientific method" and must amount to more than "subjective belief
or unsupported speculation."' Based upon the phrase "assist the trier of
30. This is not to deny that scientists are sometimes quite conservative. Famous examples of such
conservatism include Einstein's reluctance to accept quantum mechanics, see JEREMY BERNSTEIN,
EINsTEIN 175, 175-76 (Frank Kermode ed., 1973) (attributing Einstein's rejection of quantum
mechanics in part to his "incredible stubbornness"), and geologists' unwillingness to accept the
continental-drift hypothesis, see MARTIN SCHWARzBACH, ALFRED WEGENER: THE FATHER OF
CoNTiNENrAL DRIPFT 106 (Carla Love trans., Science Tech, Inc. 1986) (1980) (stating that the reaction
to the theory of continental drift was "overwhelmingly negative" for several decades after its proposal).
Nonetheless, when quantum mechanics and continental drift were relatively new theories, a scientist
describing the state of physics or geology would not have ignored these theories altogether, even if she
treated them dismissively.
31. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2793 (1993).
32. FED. R. EviD. 702.
33. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
34. Id.
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fact," the Court set a standard of relevance.35 The expert testimony must
"fit" the case for which it is proffered; for the testimony to aid the
factfinder appropriately, there must be a "valid scientific connection"
between the testimony and the facts of the case.' With these remarks,
the Court singled out the methods and procedures of science as well as the
relationship between scientific information and legal disputes, suggesting
that the reliability and relevance of scientific information differ in kind
from the reliability and relevance of other sorts of information.
After proposing the distinctiveness of scientific knowledge, the Court
offered some guidance in identifying characteristically scientific
testimony." Daubert articulates four factors to guide courts in evaluating
whether proffered scientific expert testimony constitutes scientific
knowledge that will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact
in issue: testability, peer review and publication, rate of error, and general
acceptance.38 The Court makes it clear that these criteria are simply
guidelines for determining whether information is genuinely scientific; no
single criterion nor any combination of criteria establishes a necessary or
sufficient condition for admissibility.39
The Court explains the purpose of each factor as follows. Testability
guarantees that putative scientific knowledge consists of hypotheses whose
likely truth or falsity can be assessed through systematic comparison to the
actual state of the world.' Peer review and publication ensure reliability
because independent scientists have checked the soundness of an individual
investigator's work.4' Rate of error more directly attests to the reliability
of any particular technique or method.42 Finally, whether a method
enjoys general acceptance within "the relevant scientific community" has
some bearing on reliability because general acceptance, like peer review,
35. Id.
36. Id. at2796.
37. Id. at 2796-98. Some scholars argue that Daubert makes scientific validity the central issue
in deciding admissibility. See, e.g., Susan R. Poulter, Daubert and Scientific Evidence: Assessing
Evidentiary Reliability in Toxic Tort Litigation, 1093 UTAH L. REV. 1307, 1320-21 ("The Court
correctly denominated validity as the linchpin of admissibility because validity relates to whether the
methods in question are capable of measuring what they purport to measure."); Sanders, supra note
10, at 1398 ("At the core of the Court's analysis of admissibility under Rule 702... is the idea of
scientific validity."). I do not disagree with this position, but I think Daubert's real import lies in the
particular guidelines the decision announces for assessing validity.
38. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796-97. In this Article, I do not discuss the rate of error criterion
extensively because it is relatively straightforward and insignificant in distinguishing scientific
knowledge from other kinds of knowledge.
39. E.g., id. at 2796 ("Many factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do not presume to set out
a definitive checklist or test."); id. at 2797 ("The inquiry envisioned by rule 702 is, we emphasize, a
flexible one.").
40. Id. at 2796-97.
41. Id. at 2797.
42. Id.
[Vol. 74:1
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presumably demonstrates agreement among scientists as to the soundness
of a particular technique.'
C. Frye and Daubert. A Preliminary Comparison
The meaning of the guidelines set out in Frye and Daubert and the
relationships between them requires clarification, which I provide in
subpart I(A). For now, I want simply to note that Daubert endeavors to
guard against the admission of pseudo-scientific testimony while avoiding
the problems with Frye that I discussed previously.'
As I will discuss more thoroughly in Part El, Daubert's testability
criterion ensures that scientific testimony will have an empirical basis, one
of the central distinguishing features of science. In addition, Daubert's
retention of general acceptance as one factor in admissibility allows courts
to consult scientific opinion as to whether the methods on which scientific
testimony is based are indeed genuinely empirical.
By allowing trial judges to consider testability, peer review, and
publication in addition to general acceptance, however, Daubert makes
room for testimony based on innovative research developed with techniques
not yet generally accepted so long as they are genuinely empirical methods
or have received some scrutiny from other scientists. Just by adding these
criteria to general acceptance, Daubert comports with a scientific approach
to admissibility more closely than Frye did. To fully understand just how
accurately Daubert captures the nature of modem science requires a more
detailed understanding of the Daubert guidelines.
I. Digging More Deeply into Daubert
In this section, I argue for two claims. First, the best interpretation
of Daubert resolves a potential tension between the testability guideline and
the peer review and publication and general acceptance guidelines.
Second, once we fully understand the vision of science that informs
Daubert, it becomes evident that in many mass exposure lawsuits, scientific
expert testimony will reveal severe uncertainty among scientists.
A. TWo Kinds of Empiricism and the Daubert Guidelines
Philosophers, as well as jurists; have sought to distinguish science
from other human enterprises. According to logical empiricism, the
43. Id. at 2798.
44. See supra subpart H(A). Daubert's significance as a bar to the use of fishy science has already
been noted by commentators. See Sheila L. Birnbaum & J. Russell Jackson, Almost a Year After the
Daubert Ruling, Courts Start to Recognize and Apply the Strict New Standard on Scientific Expert
Testimony, NAT'L L.J., May 16, 1994, at B5 (discussing two cases in which courts excluded testimony
underDaubert).
Texas Law Review
dominant philosophy of science in the mid-twentieth century,45 testability
is the sole distinguishing feature of science." When the Daubert Court
cited Carl Hempel and Karl Popper, two distinguished logical empiri-
cists,47 as authorities for the testability guideline,48 the Court seemed to
be committing itself to logical empiricism and its position on the distinc-
tiveness of science. If this were the case, however, it would not have
made sense for the Court to assign peer review, publication, and general
acceptance equal and independent weight as guidelines for identifying
respectable science. A Court fully in the grips of logical empiricism
would, at most, have treated these guidelines as indicia of testability.
Instead, the Daubert Court suggested that they possess independent
significance.
Guidelines such as peer review, publication, and general acceptance
are more compatible with revised empiricism, a philosophical revision of
logical empiricism that dominates late-twentieth-century philosophy of
science. As I will demonstrate subsequently, revised empiricism developed
in response to shortcomings in the logical empiricist account of testability.
While revised empiricists continue to regard a version of testability as one
distinctive feature of science, they stress the definitive role of scientists'
collective judgment in making testability work. On this view, scientists'
collective judgments-facilitated and established through devices such as
peer review and publication and measured by general acceptance-are as
distinctively characteristic of science as testability itself. Despite its
citations to logical empiricism, the Daubert Court ultimately, if
unintentionally, endorsed revised empiricism by putting peer review,
publication, and general acceptance on an equal footing with testability,
treating all as equally distinctive features'of science. To fully understand
each guideline, and the relationships between them, we must explore the
evolution from logical to revised empiricism.
Logical empiricists sought to describe scientific beliefs as logically
structured systems in an effort to distinguish "real science" from
45. See PATRICIA S. CHURCHLAND, NEUROPHILOSOPHY: TOWARD A UNIFIED SCIENCE OF THE
MIND-BRAIN 253 (1986) (stating that from 1940 to 1960, logical empiricism greatly influenced science).
46. Id. at 254, 254-55 (describing the logical empiricists' goal of distinguishing "real science"
from "its phony pretenders" through testing).
47. The contours of logical empiricism can be described in various ways, including some that
would categorize Hempel, but not Popper, as a logical empiricist. For purposes of understanding
Daubert, it is useful to focus on the logical empiricist commitment to testability understood in a
particular way. See infra text accompanying notes 54-57. Popper shared this commitment, which is
why, for present purposes, I count him a logical empiricist.
48. Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2797 (1993). Foran original
discussion of testability, see KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 40-41 (1959)
(discussing the significance of experimental refutation of hypotheses).
[Vol. 74:1
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"unconstrained speculation, metaphysical posing and assorted mush."49
The logical empiricists held that scientifically justified beliefs either
followed logically from sensory beliefs or simply were sensory beliefs.
According to the empiricists, sensory beliefs are expressed in observation
sentences, such as "red here now" or "there is a red chair there," which
report privately experienced sense impressions in a most minimal
fashion.' When a scientist wants to test a hypothesis, she should deduce
from it observation sentences and initial conditions and then determine
through experimentation whether the deduced observations issue under the
specified conditions. 1 If so, the hypothesis is "confirmed," a term of art
specified by Hempel.52 If, for instance, we wanted to test the hypothesis
that ice melts in the sun, we would deduce the expected observation that
ice will turn to water in initial conditions of direct sunlight. If, when we
perform the experiment of placing an ice cube directly in the sun, the cube
turns to water, we will have confirmed the original hypothesis.
This example hints at Popper's major contribution to logical
empiricism. Actual scientists do not proceed simply by experimentally
testing noncontroversial or trivial hypotheses, such as "ice melts in the
sun," which are readily and unsurprisingly confirmed. Doing so contri-
butes little to the growth of knowledge. If, however, a scientist
demonstrates experimentally the falsity of a seemingly uncontroversial yet
significant hypothesis, we learn a great deal. When Columbus proved that
the earth was not flat, for example, he and his contemporaries added
importantly to their stock of learning. If today a scientist were to confirm
that the earth is round, his findings would be trivial in the extreme.
Popper taught that falsifying hypotheses was at least as important as
confirming them. 3 Eventually, more sophisticated Popperian philo-
sophers of science recognized that science progresses either when an
unlikely hypothesis is confirmed or when a likely one is falsified. 4 In
either case, the scientist learns, relative to current belief. For present
purposes, note that whether a scientist aims to confirm or to falsify a
hypothesis, she will proceed through empirical testing. What shifts is the
49. CHURCHLAND, supra note 45, at 254. Given that the Daubert Court's goals mirrored the
logical empiricists' objective of distinguishing "real science," it is not surprising that the Court found
the empiricists' work congenial.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 254-55.
52. CARL G. HEMPEL, ASPECTs OF SCImNTIFIC EXPLANATION 3-51 (1965). It is important to note
that confirmation is never conclusive. No matter how many times a hypothesis is experimentally
confirmed, there is no guarantee that it will be confirmed again the next time. Thus, no hypothesis
about the physical world can be conclusively confirmed.
53. POPPER, supra note 48, at 40-42.
54. ALAN F. CHALMERs, WHAT Is THIS THING CALLED ScIENCE? 54-55 (2d ed. 1982).
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initial likelihood of her hypothesis. Because science progresses both by
confirming the unlikely and falsifying the likely, neither an unlikely
hypothesis nor a surprising result is contrary to good science.
Logical empiricism oversimplifies scientific experimentation,
regardless of whether the scientist aims at confirmation or falsification.
The logical empiricist account presupposes that both initial conditions and
observational results can be specified in basically incontestable terms,
thereby enabling the straightforward experimental confirmation or falsifi-
cation of the tested hypothesis. Here is the logical empiricist model of
testability, presented schematically:
1. Hypothesis.
2. Initial conditions, including background assumptions.
3. Expected observational results.
4. Experiment.
5. Observed results.
If (5) coincides with (3), the hypothesis is confirmed. If (5) contradicts
(3), the hypothesis is falsified. Presented in this form, it is easy to see that
if the observed results contradict the expected results, it is logically
possible for either the hypothesis or one of the propositions in the specifi-
cation of the initial conditions to be false. This complicates both
confirmation and falsification. Suppose a scientist performs an experiment,
and the observed results contradict expected results. Confirmation is not
ruled out, nor is falsification established: the falsehood may lie not in the
hypothesis, but in the initial conditions, specifically within the background
theories and assumptions that underpin any experiment.55
Moreover, observations and observation sentences are themselves
theory-dependent.56 Our theories shape what we notice and which obser-
vations we find significant; they mold how we conceptualize and articulate
our observations. This means that observations do not provide a perfectly
independent test for measuring the truth of our theories or hypotheses.
How we interpret our observations and whether we do or do not attach
significance to a particular result are at least partially determined by our
background assumptions, rather than purely determined by how the world
actually is. Confirmation and falsification are, therefore, shot through with
scientific judgment: the world is not the exclusive determinant of the
content and interpretation of the observed result; background theory and
assumptions contribute significantly. This means that observations
55. Id. at 32-34.
56. Id. at 28-34; CHURCHLAND, supra note 45, at 265-71; THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE
OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 43-51 (2d ed. 1970); HELEN E. LONGINO, SCIENCE AS SOCIAL
KNOWLEDGE: VALUES AND OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY 26-27, 45-48, 56-57 (1990).
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themselves are revisable not only in response to additional empirical data,
but also in the name of preserving a hypothesis or a background theory."
To preserve the idea of testability, there must be some principled way
of distinguishing observation sentences from theoretical ones, along with
a principled way of deciding what to reject and what to revise when
hypotheses and observation clash. Much post-logical empiricist philosophy
of science attacks these problems. Like the logical empiricists, many
contemporary theorists-including Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, and Helen
Longino-maintain commitments to empiricism and to the idea that science
is a distinctive human enterprise. 8 Unlike logical empiricism, however,
revised empiricism vindicates these commitments by emphasizing the
holistic nature of scientific theory and the sociology of scientific
practice. 9 Note particularly that the revised empiricist account of science
portrays "ordinary, normal" science. It is not primarily an account of
"revolutionary science," nor does it depict science as a series of drastic
"paradigm shifts."
Revised empiricists start from the recognition that logic alone cannot
distinguish observation sentences from theoretical ones, nor can it
determine what to revise or reject in a clash between hypothesis and
observation. These premises motivate a picture of scientific theories as
holistic accounts of the world, each theory generating concepts, hypotheses,
and experimental programs that possess meaning and significance in the
context of the original theory.' On this view, "there is no such thing as
57. KUHN, supra note 56, at 114-17, 120-22; LONGINO, supra note 56, at 46-48.
58. See, e.g., WIRE LAKATOS, THE METHODOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PROGRAMMES 1-7
(John Worrall & Gregory Currie eds., 1978).
59. Revised empiricism holds sway among contemporary scientists, physicians, and historians of
science as well as contemporary philosophers of science. See Brief Amici Curiae of Physicians,
Scientists, and Historians of Science in Support of Petitioners, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (No. 92-102) (arguing for a Kuhnian conception of
science) (listing among the amici curiae Stephen Jay Gould, Alexander Agassiz Professor of Zoology,
Professor of Geology, and Professor of the History of Science at Harvard University and Fellow of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences,
and the National Academy of Sciences; Gerald Holton, Mallinckrodt Professor of Physics and Professor
of the History of Science at Harvard University and past Secretary of the American Academy of Arts
and Sciences; and Peter Infante, an epidemiologist who has worked at the Centers for Disease Control
and is a Fellow of the American College of Epidemiology). See generally Brief of the Carnegie
Commission on Science, Technology, and Government as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party
at 11, Daubert (No. 92-102) (arguing that distinctively scientific knowledge possesses features in
addition to testability); Brief for the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the
National Academy of Sciences as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 18, Daubert (No. 92-102)
(arguing for the centrality of the scientific community's collective judgment in evaluating scientific
claims); Brief of the New England Journal of Medicine, Journal of the American Medical Association,
and Annals of Internal Medicine as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 2, Daubert (No. 92-102)
(arguing for thejoint importance of peer review and experimental testing in producing "good science").
60. CHALMERS, supra note 54, at 77 (describing scientific theories as "structured wholes"). Kuhn
calls the complex of theory, concepts, hypotheses, and experimental program a "paradigm." KUHN,
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a once-and-for-all crucial experiment in which a hypothesis is conclusively
demonstrated to be false. A test for a hypothesis is crucial not absolutely,
but relative to background assumptions."6' In principle, the truth of any
sentence can be maintained by making adjustments elsewhere in the
theory.62 Neither logic nor empirical observation can completely clinch
the truth or falsity of any hypothesis.
Such a picture threatens to detach science from its empirical base and
to plunge any given theory into a sea of ever-possible revision. Revised
empiricists, with their sensitivity to scientific practice, recognize that under
most circumstances scientists do not-and do not feel free to-whimsically
revise and reject hypotheses or observations. The puzzle for revised
empiricism is to reconcile the absence of conclusive logical or empirical
constraint with the sense that the construction of scientific theories is
neither arbitrary nor a matter of unfettered personal choice.
According to revised empiricists, scientists make a series of
reasoned-but always revisable-commitments that constrain theory choice
and development. First, scientists commit to a theory and its concomitant
concepts, hypotheses, and experimental program.' Second, within a
theory, scientists commit to certain assumptions and premises, working to
preserve these regardless of the outcome of future research.' In a clash
between these assumptions or premises and an experimental result, the
scientist tries to interpret the data so as to preserve the privileged
assumptions or premises.'
These commitments are not existential leaps. They are based on
considerations born of the scientific aspiration to understand the world in
a way that enables prediction. Scientists prefer theories-and within
theories, assumptions and premises-that further this goal. Subsidiary
considerations that help enable prediction include simplicity, unity of
theory, and the availability of better alternatives.' Selecting theoretical
commitments on the basis of such considerations calls for human judgment.
supra note 56, at 43-51. Lakatos terms the complex a "research programme." LAKATOS, supra note
58, at 47-52, 86-90. For present purposes, we need not isolate or compare the specifics of paradigms
and research programs.
61. 'CHURCHLAND, supra note 45, at 262 (emphasis in original); see also Brief of the Carnegie
Commission, supra note 59, at 9, 11 (stressing the provisional nature of scientific findings); Brief of
the American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 12, Daubert (No.
92-102) ("Hypotheses are framed in terms of the relationship between two variables."); Brief Amici
Curiae of Physicians, Scientists, and Historians of Science, supra note 59, at 11-13 (arguing against
the immutability of scientific "truths").
62. CHURCHLAND, supra note 45, at 263.
63. CHALMERS, supra note 54, at 80-81.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. CHMcHIAND, supra note 45, at 263.
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Despite occasional suggestions to the contrary,67 revised empiricists
generally emphasize that the judgment in question is collective, not
individual.6" Selecting a theory and privileging certain of its assumptions
and premises is a collective process comprised of institutionalized
educational and scholarly practices that shape and check individual
judgment.69 This collective process imposes an additional constraint on
a scientist's theoretical commitments.
According to revised empiricist accounts, science progresses as
scientists trade in one theory for another, as they collectively come to
recognize that a rival to the established theory better satisfies the various
scientific desiderata-predictive power, simplicity, unity of theory,
fruitfulness, and so on.' ° Sometimes an established theory is wholly
replaced by a new contender; sometimes, the successor is a recognizable
version of its predecessor. The impetus for change arises from short-
comings in the settled view. As scientists work with a theory, they find
that there are phenomena it either cannot explain or can explain only by
adding ad hoc premises and assumptions. Or, they find that the theory
provides little or no guidance as to how to proceed experimentally to
acquire further understanding.7 As scientists become disenchanted with
the resources of the prevailing theory, they consider alternatives more
carefully. Some scientists begin working with alternative frameworks. If
one of these outstrips the previously entrenched view, it gradually becomes
mainstream-the view into which novice scientists are educated and within
which they work, until its shortcomings become apparent and motivate
exploration of new rivals.72 At any given time, alternatives to mainstream
theory will be available, and one of them may emerge as a replacement,
even if it seems at the time that the mainstream view is the obviously
superior one.
Revised empiricism retains but transforms the idea of testability.'
Logical empiricists viewed testability as a product of straightforward
observation and deductive inference; revised empiricists see testability as
67. See, e.g., KUHN, supra note 56, at 122-23 ("On [some] ... occasions the relevant
illumination comes in [a single scientist's] sleep.").
68. See, e.g., KUHN, supra note 56, at 176-91 (noting the importance of the community structure
of science in establishing and defining a paradigm); LONOINO, supra note 56, at 66-81 (arguing that
theories that fail to take into account the effect of community involvement in developing scientific
thought do not adequately describe the process by which hypotheses are formed).
69. LONGINO, supra note 56, at 68-69, 76-77;.Yee KUHN, supra note 56, at 43, 167-70 (explaining
the role that the community plays in determining shared rules).
70. CHURCHLAND, supra note 45, at 263; see also Brief for the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, supra note 59, at 7-9 (explaining the cumulative nature of scientific inquiry).
71. CHALMERS, supra note 54, at 94; KUHN, supra note 56, at 52-65, 69.
72. CHALMERS, supra note 54, at 95-96; KUHN, supra note 56, at 108, 111, 153-59.
73. CHALMERS, supra note 54, at 84, 90-92; LONGINO, supra note 56, at 38-40, 53-56.
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a matter of theory-dependent observation, deductive inference, and a hefty
dose of contingent judgment. The revised empiricist preserves empiricism
by using the standard of collective judgment to establish the distinction
between theory and observation that the logical empiricist took for granted.
The revised empiricist also relies on the standard of collective judgment to
select which tenets will be maintained despite recalcitrant experimental
outcomes, at least for the time being. This establishes which propositions
will qualify as testable hypotheses. Once scientists collectively stipulate
certain sentences as fixed assumptions and others as fixed observations,
testability can get off the ground. So long as scientists agree upon these
stipulations, they will interpret experimental data in essentially the same
way, deductively inferring the truth or falsity of proposed hypotheses.74
In the scheme of revised empiricism, peer review and publication
foster agreement on fixed assumptions and observations; general acceptance
reflects the choices the scientific community has made. Viewed in this
light, Daubert's emphasis on these factors is not inconsistent with its
commitment to testability, contrary to at least one scholar's argument.75
In fact, in recognizing the roles of peer review, publication, and general
acceptance in the production of science, the Court preserves the
meaningfulness of testability.
B. Revised Empiricism and Scientific Uncertainty
Science is dynamic. This is the central lesson of the switch from
logical to revised empiricism. In science, revisability is always an option.
As scientists acquire new data and change their collective judgments about
which background assumptions to hold constant, they revise and replace
even well-established scientific theories.76 Scientific theory does not
achieve absolute finality. Even when one theory enjoys preeminence, other
theories are available for consideration. Rival views are a valuable and
usual part of the scientific process, providing fodder and stimulation for
74. In principle, however, rational scientists can disagree over these matters, even after
accumulating large amounts of data, if they disagree over which assumptions and observations to hold
fixed. See, e.g., CHURCHLIAND, supra note 45, at 263 ("[N]o sentence has special epistemic properties
that protect it from revision. Accordingly, it is possible for rational scientists ... to continue to
disagree even after a great deal of data is accumulated." (citation omitted)).
75. Margaret A. Berger, ProceduralParadignsforApplying the Daubert Test, 78 MINN. L. REV.
1345, 1375 (1994).
76. BriefAmici Curiae of Physicians, Scientists, and Historians of Science, supra note 59, at 7-16
(describing science as an incomplete process forwarded by the revolutionary discarding of old theories
for new ones). One of the most famous historical examples of this process is the Copernican
Revolution, the switch from Ptolemaic to Copernican astronomy. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN,
THE COPERNICAN REVOLUTION: PLANETARY ASTRONOMY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF WESrERN
THOUGHT (1985).
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those researching in the mainstream.' Even when scientific research is
totally embedded in the prevailing theory, investigators seek to confirm
novel hypotheses and falsify received ones. Starting from unusual supposi-
tions and producing surprising results are integral parts of science,78
although they add to its instability.
A dynamic enterprise like science does not produce fixed, unassailable
conclusions. It produces a range of opinions, some more widely shared
than others. A rigid general acceptance standard for the admissibility of
scientific testimony pretends otherwise. That sort of standard gives the
legal factfinder an edited version of science. Strip away the editing, as
Daubert has done, and the factflnder will more often encounter scientific
uncertainty. If courts admit scientific expert testimony according to revised
empiricist criteria, rather than relying exclusively on general acceptance,
often the proper conclusion for the legal factfinder to reach will be that the
answer is uncertain. On a revised empiricist view of science, uncertainty
among scientists is a natural state of affairs. Shifting from Frye to Daubert
brings legal standards into line with revised empiricist standards for
selecting information worth considering. Now legal factfinders will have
access to the same range of information scientists would consider.
Uncertainty in science will show up at trial.
This will be especially true in mass exposure litigation. Scientific
research into causation is a slow, arduous process, often barely begun
when litigation commences.79 At that time, rival theories about the
toxicity of the litigated substance or device will have respectable adherents,
all operating in good faith. Eventually, one theory may garner the en-
dorsement of most scientists-and this may constitute sufficient "certainty"
for legal purposes-but in most cases this will not happen during the
lifetime of tort litigation. In many cases, trials will occur in the period
when scientists have developed several promising alternatives but no one
theory has become well established. At that point, opposing parties each
can present scientific testimony that gives them a chance at winning, so
plaintiffs have incentive to bring suit and defendants have incentive not to
77. BriefAmici Curiae of Physicians, Scientists, and Historians of Science, supra note 59, at 15-
16 (asserting that heretical and eccentric views have often facilitated the advance of science); see Brief
of the Carnegie Commission, supra note 59, at 5 (noting the role of dissenting researchers in furthering
scientific progress).
78. See Brief for the American Association for the Advancement of Science, supra note 59, at 7
("The scientific community has a special interest in encouraging innovative thinking while
simultaneously ensuring that new ideas are subject to rigorous review.").
79. Under the best of circumstances, scientific study of general causation proceeds slowly. It is
delayed by long latency periods and the absence of unique correlations between particular substances
and specific diseases. Poulter, supra note 37, at 1307 n.4; see also JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION
132-40 (1995) (describing the early stages of scientific research relevant to a lawsuit brought by
plaintiffs suffering from leukemia all living near a possibly contaminated source of drinking water).
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settle. If the case goes to trial, Daubert's revised empiricist criteria for
admissibility will allow the factfinder to hear the full range of scientific
opinion on the issue of cause-in-fact. Often, the only reasonable
conclusion for the factfinder to draw will be that, according to science, the
causal powers of the litigated substance or device are basically unknown.
IV. Daubert Applied: The Case of Silicone Breast Implants
In this section, I will argue that, as the revised empiricists would
expect, there is currently disagreement among scientists over the toxicity
of silicone breast implants; that scientists who have performed research into
the question regard their own findings as highly tentative; that research in
different scientific subdisciplines indicates opposing conclusions on the
question of toxicity: in sum, among scientists there is genuine uncertainty
about the causal effects of silicone when implanted in the human body. In
specific breast implant trials, scientific expert testimony admissible under
Daubert will reveal this state of the science to the legal factfinder whether
the factfinder is presented simply with rival conclusions or with a more
detailed picture of the scientific bases for these conclusions. Presented
with testimony that attests to the uncertainty among scientists, a reasonable
legal factfinder would, it seems, have to conclude that the causal powers
of silicone implants are unknown. To illustrate the point, I will focus on
the current silicone breast implant litigation and the specific example of a
hypothetical case brought on behalf of a child of an implant recipient.
Then, I will specify the relationship between revised empiricism and the
current inability to draw conclusions about the safety of silicone breast
implants.
A. An Overview of the Breast Implant Litigation
In 1962, manufacturers began marketing silicone breast implants in the
United States.' These implants have since been associated with a variety
of health problems; however, some of these associations are more settled
than others. For example, it is uncontroversial that a significant number
of women with implants suffer from capsular contracture, a painful and
aesthetically displeasing hardening of the tissue around the implants."1
Treatment for capsular contracture includes techniques that increase the
80. Robert Steinbrook, Link Between Implants, Immune Diseases Is Seen, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20,
1992, at Al, A24.
81. See Nir Kossovsky & Charles J. Freiman, Silicone Breast Implant Pathology: Clinical Data
and Immunologic Consequences, 118 ARCHIVES PATHOLOGY & LABORATORY MED. 686, 689 (1994)
(reporting that the incidence of capsular contracture in women with breast implants is 32%); David A.
Kessler et al., Letters: Silicone Gel Breast Implants, 272 JAMA 273, 273 (1994) (letter to editor)
(listing capsular contracture among the established risks of silicone gel breast implants).
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likelihood of the implant's rupture.' Whether intact or ruptured, silicone
implants interfere with mammography' and therefore may impede the
early detection and prompt treatment of breast cancer." More con-
troversial are the links between medical problems such as connective-tissue
disorders and autoimmune diseases and exposure to silicone leaked from
intact implants or escaped from ruptured ones.'
From the late 1970s through 1991, Dow Corning Wright, the leading
producer of implants in the United States,86 received thousands of
complaints about the silicone implants and settled numerous actions brought
by women who had received the implants. Because these settlements
always contained nondisclosure clauses, their precise terms remain
unavailable to the public.'
In the early 1990s, three plaintiffs won large verdicts against implant
manufacturers. A jury awarded Anna Livshits almost $4.5 million, of
which just less than $3 million was set aside on defendant's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.8" Marianne Hopkins recovered
$840,000 in compensatory damages and $6.5 million in punitive damages
from Dow Coming.89 The Ninth Circuit upheld Hopkins's award,
82. See Council on Scientific Affairs, American Med. Ass'n, Silicone Gel Breast Implants, 270
JAMA 2602, 2604 (1993) (stating that there is a risk of rupture with the closed capsulotomy treatment
of capsular eontracture).
83. See D. David Dershaw &Ted A. Chaglassain, MammographyAfter Prosthesis Placementfor
Augmentation or Reconstructive Mammoplasty, 170 RADIoLoGY 69, 72-73 (1989) (stating that silicone
implants may obscure tissue masses); Neal Handel et al., Factors Affecting Mammographic
Visualization of the Breast After Augmentation Mammaplasty, 268 JAMA 1913, 1915-16 (1992)
(reporting that breast implants reduce the area of tissue visualized by both compression and
displacement mammography).
84. See Kelley P. Douglas et al., Roentgenographic Evaluation of the Augmented Breast, 84 S.
MED. J. 49, 53 (1992); Melvin J. Silverstein et al., Breast Cancer Diagnosis and Prognosis in Women
Following Augmentation with Silicone Gel-Filled Prostheses, 28 EUR. J. CANcER 635, 639 (1992) (both
finding a decreased capability of mammography to detect palpable breast cancer in women with breast
implants).
85. As early as the 1970s, scientific research indicated a possible connection between silicone
implants and autoimmune diseases. Philip J. Hilts, Strange History of Silicone Held Many Warning
Signs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1992, at 1. This connection is still a matter of dispute among scientists.
See infra subpart IV(B).
86. Steinbrook, supra note 80, at A24. Dow Coming Wright is a subsidiary of Dow Coming
Corporation. Id.
87. Patricia Anstett, Legal Deals Silence Pain: Breast-Implant Settlements Kept Health Problems
Quiet, DET. NEWS & FREE PRESS, Feb. 15, 1992, at IA, 12A.
88. Livshitsv. Natural Y Surgical Specialties, Inc., 35 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 433,433-
34 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Livshits's implants had to be removed due to chronic infection; upon removal
the implants ruptured. Id. at 434. Shortly thereafter, Livshits was diagnosed with breast cancer in her
right breast. Id. Due to the lumps of silicone in her breasts, her physician concluded that
mammography would not be a reliable monitor of her condition, and Livshits underwent a radical
mastectomy of one of her breasts. Id. at 435. Her physician also concluded that a prophylactic
mastectomy of the other breast would probably be necessary. Id. Livshits recovered on a breach of
warranty theory. Id. at 436.
89. Hopkins v. Dow Coming Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 734 (1995). Hopkins's implants, which she received in post-mastectomy breast reconstruction
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specifically rejecting Dow Corning's argument that the trial court had erred
in admitting Hopkins's expert testimony on causation; applying Daubert,
the Court of Appeals upheld the trial judge's admissibility decision.'
Finally, a jury voted to award Brenda Toole $350,000 in compensatory
damages and $5 million in punitive damages in her suit against Baxter
Healthcare Corporation, the successor to Heyer-Schulte, the manufacturer
of Toole's implants.91  The Eleventh Circuit subsequently granted
Baxter's motion for a new trial on liability and damages on the ground that
federal agency reports had been improperly admitted into evidence at
trial. 2
After the Hopkins verdict, the Food and Drug Administration imposed
a temporary moratorium on cosmetic silicone breast implants and opened
an investigation into the safety of the implants.'o The moratorium was
later made permanent except for purposes of clinical study.' After the
imposition of the temporary moratorium, the rate and number of case
filings against implant manufacturers increased dramatically.' 5  In
February 1992, Dow Coming reorganized its top management, assigning
its new chief executive officer, Keith R. Mennon, full-time responsibility
for handling breast implant-related issues.96
Following a highly publicized dispute within the plaintiffs' bar about
the appropriate forum and procedure for handling the cases,' the federal
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated pending federal
breast implant litigation under Judge Sam Pointer, Jr., in the Northern
surgery, ruptured. She alleged that silicone from the ruptured implants caused her mixed connective
tissue disease, and she recovered on theories of fraud, strict products liability, and breach of implied
and express warranties. Id. at 1118-19.
90. Id. at 1124-25.
91. Toole v. McClintock, 778 F. Supp. 1543, 1545 (M.D. Ala. 1991). Toole suffered severe
capsular contracture. Treatment of the condition ruptured her implants, and she required repeated
surgeries to remove silicone lumps in her breasts. Id. at 1546. She recovered in a negligence action
for failure to warn. Id. at 1547.
92. Toole v. McClintock, 999 F.2d 1430, 1433-35 (11th Cir. 1993).
93. Deborah R. Baurae, Moratorium on Breast Implants Injects Controversy, Anxiety, CHI. TRIt.,
Jan. 19, 1992, at 11.
94. Bruce Ingersoll & Walt Bogdanick, New Rules Dim Silicone Implant Revival Hopes, WALL
ST. I., Apr. 17, 1992, at B1.
95. Lindsey v. Dow Coming Corp. (In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig.), No.
CV 92-P-10000-S, Civ. A. No. CV94-P-11558-S, 1994 WL 578353, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994).
96. Marlene Cimons, Data Raises New Concerns on Breast Implant Safety, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 11,
1992, at Al, A14.
97. See, e.g., Mark Hansen, Lawyers Spar Over Implant Litigation, A.B.A. J., June 1992, at 16;
Tracey Schroth, Breast Implants: Latest Toxic Tort; Plaintiffs' Bar Launches Aggressive Drive for
Clients, N.J. LJ., Apr. 13, 1992, at 1, 28 (both describing the debate within the plaintiffs' bar as to
whether the litigation should proceed as a nationwide class action or should be consolidated as
multidistrict litigation for discovery only).
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District of Alabama.9" Pointer later certified a class action for purposes
of settlement," confirmed the certification,"u and approved a settlement
negotiated by the class and selected defendants, including Dow Coming
and Baxter Healthcare.''
Implant manufacturers committed nearly $4.25 billion to the
compensation fund, rendering it the largest medical product liability
settlement in history."° Nonetheless, Judge Pointer recently announced
that the amount cannot provide adequate compensation given the rising
number of claimants," 3 despite evidence suggesting that Dow Chemical-
Dow Corning's parent company-was sufficiently involved in the research
and marketing of the breast implants to justify making Dow Chemical a
party to the global settlement, thereby increasing its funding."°
On September 8, 1995, in a recording played over the court-operated
breast-implant settlement hotline, the Judge stated there was no reason to
keep the plan in place.' °5 More than 400,000 have claimed the right to
compensation under the fund; more than 70,000 might qualify for
immediate benefits."°6 Paying these women the proposed minimum
benefit would cost $7.3 billion."° Only drastic reductions in payments
98. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992).
99. Lindsey v. Dow Coming Corp. (In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig.), No.
CV 92-P-10000-S, Civ. A. No. CV94-P-11558-S, 1994 WL 114580, at *1-*4 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 1,
1994).
100. Lindsey v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig.) No.
CV 92-P-10000-S, Civ. A. No. CV94-P-11558-S, 1994 WL 578353, at *24-*26 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1,
1994).
101. Id. at *1. The highly detailed $4,225,070,000 settlement included a program for receiving
claims over a 30-year period and for making payments that did not depend on the amount of
contributions or financial resources of the defendant that supplied the particular claimant's implants;
a simplified claims procedure that did not involve adversarial proceedings or require examinations by
court-appointed physicians; the initial identification of certain diseases for which compensation would
be paid without requiring proof of causation; a procedure for adding to this list other diseases should
this have been warranted by scientific research; and the creation of funds to pay costs other than
compensation for officially recognized diseases, including compensation for ruptured implants and
medical evaluations. Id. at *-*2. The disease compensation program did not include any diseases
contracted by the natural children of women with silicone breast implants. Id. at *8. Children were,
however, members of the settlement class. Id. at *24-*25. Children were able to opt out of the
settlement until two years after attaining majority or two years after manifesting symptoms of illness
claimed to result from a maternal implant, whichever came later. Id. at *9.
102. Nancy R. Brooks & Henry Weinstein, Judge Declares Breast Implant Settlement Pool Too
Small; Lawsuits: Negotiations Continue to Increase the $4-Billion Pool, But the Decision May Impel
More Women to Pursue Individual Claims, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 9, 1995, at Dl.
103. Dennis Fiely, Rally to Focus on Implant Issues, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 15, 1995, at
C3, available in LEXIS, News Library, COLDIS File.
104. See Dow Chemical Stock Drops, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1994, at A44; Brenda Sapino, Dow
Chemical Becomes $1 Billion Implant Target, TEX. LAW., Nov. 7, 1994, at 10.




would enable the fund to cover the eligible claims."0 8 The recording
announced:
The Court believes that the extreme reduction in benefit
amounts would result in so many class members opting out that the
settling manufacturers would in turn withdraw from the
settlement.... In light of this, as well as the complications
presented by the Dow Corning bankruptcy proceeding, Judge Pointer
has preliminarily concluded that there is'no justification for keeping
the current settlement in place.' 9
On October 2, the Judge was scheduled to issue a court order
restructuring or dissolving the global settlement.11 As of October 4,
1995, however, the court had not issued such an order because three
implant manufacturers had submitted a new settlement proposal to the court
and plaintiffs' class counsel."' As of October 4, it seems impossible to
predict whether any type of settlement will result from the multidistrict
litigation or whether the class will be dissolved with any future cases to be
litigated on an individual basis.
Breast implant plaintiffs who have opted out of the federal class action
have been pursuing their claims in state courts. The most significant recent
state court litigation is unfolding in Texas: in two recent trials,"2 the
same jury awarded $5.2 million to one plaintiff but no damages to the
other."' In both of these suits, Dow Chemical, Dow Corning's parent,
is a named defendant." 4
As the saga of the global settlement fund unfolded, there were several
developments in the scientific research on silicone breast implants and the
litigation involving Dow Coming Wright. On May 15, Dow Coming
sought bankruptcy protection in the Eastern District of Michigan. 5
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Fiely, supra note 103, at 3C.
111. According to the settlement information hotline, women with 3M, Baxter, or Bristol-Myers
implants who submit claims under the Current Disease Compensation Program could either accept a
fixed amount based on disease criteria and severity levels in the present settlement or choose to receive
a possible higher payout if they developed more serious diseases in the future and could meet more
restrictive standards for establishing a causal connection between their health problems and the
implants.
112. Lass v. Dow Coming Corp., No. 93-04266 (157th Dist. Ct., Harris County, Tex., filed Jan.
23, 1993, judgment entered, Apr. 28, 1995); Ladner v. Dow Coming Corp., No. 94-19485 (157th
Dist. Ct., Harris County, Tex., filed Apr. 26, 1994, judgment entered, Apr. 28, 1995).
113. $5 Million for Implant Leak, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1995, at A20 (claiming that the jury
awarded nothing to one plaintiff because they concluded that "sufficient information of problems had
become available when she had her implants 10 years after the [other] woman").
114. Id.
115. Voluntary Petition, In re Dow Coming Corp., No. 95-20512 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. May 15,
1995) (on file with the Texas Law Review); Milo Geyelim & Timothy D. Schellhardt, Dow Corning
Seeks Chapter 11 Shield, Clouding Status of Breast-Implant Pact, WALL ST. I., May 16, 1995, at A3.
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Subsequently, the Bankruptcy Court denied Dow's request to halt litigation
pending against Dow Chemical" 6 and denied Dow's request to transfer
the opt-outs from the global settlement who were bringing suit against Dow
Coming." 7 With the demise of the global settlement, the Eastern
District of Michigan has ordered the transfer to its jurisdiction of both opt-
in and opt-out claims against Dow Corning."' Meanwhile, on the scien-
tific front, various studies have been published indicating a lack of
association between silicone gel breast implants and connective-tissue
disorders; 9 however, critics ranging from scientists to plaintiffs' lawyers
have faulted these studies for bias due to connections between the
researchers and Dow Coming. 120
B. Scientific Research into the Toxicity of Breast Implants
Research addressing the effects of silicone breast implants on the
human body is tentative. Some research indicates that silicone breast
implants may cause harmful effects, and some research suggests that
implants cause no harmful effects.
The scientific evidence suggesting that silicone implants may cause
harmful effects comes mainly from animal studies showing that silicone
causes inflammatory and immunological reactions'21 and from human
116. Verified Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Motion for Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order, In re Dow Coming Corp., No. 95-20512 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. May 22,
1995) (on file with the Texas Law Review).
117. In re Dow Coming Corp., No. 95-20512, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 1123 (E,D. Mich. Aug. 9,
1995).
118. In re Dow Coming Corp., No. 95-CV-72397-DT, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13698 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 14, 1995) (ordering the transfer of opt-in claims); In re Dow Coming Corp., No. 95-CV-
72397, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13700 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 12, 1995) (ordering the transfer of opt-out
claims).
119. For example, the so-called "Nurses' Health Study" conducted under the auspices of Brigham
and Women's Hospital and published in the New England Journal of Medicine found no association
between silicone breast implants and connective-tissuedisease. Jorge Sinchez-Guerrero et al., Silicone
Breast Implants and the Risk of Connective-Tissue Diseases and Symptoms, 332 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1666, 1666 (1995).
120. While the Nurses' Health Study was being done, Dow Coming contributed $7 million to the
hospital and received a copy of the study questionnaire before it was distributed. Silicone Implants
Pose No Danger, Nurse's Health Study Shows, 3 Breast Implants Litig. Rep. (Mealey's) No. 16, at 18,
19 (June 29, 1995). Additionally, two authors of the study were paid consultants of several implant
manufacturers during the time the authors were conducting this research. Two Authors of Harvard
Nurses' Study Were Paid Consultants of Implant Makers, 3 Breast Implants Litig. Rep. (Mealey's) No.
8, at 10, 10 (Feb. 23, 1995).
121. See, e.g., Nahum Ben-Hur et al., Local and Systemic Effects of Dimethylpolysiloxane Fluid
in Mice, 39 PLASTIC & RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 423,423 (1967) (summarizing studies discovering
atypical inflammatory cells in mice and rats injected with silicone fluid); Gerald L. Brody & Charles
F. Frey, Peritoneal Response to Silicone Fluid, 96 ARCHIVES SURGERY 237, 238 (1968) (describing
the formation of a silicone-inducedperituneal inflammatory infiltrate in rats); John 0. Naim et al., The
Adjuvant Effect of Silicone-Gel on Antibody Formation in Rats, 22 IMMUNOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS
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case studies showing an association between silicone and serious
diseases." The scientific evidence suggesting that silicone implants do
not cause harmful effects comes primarily from epidemiological
studies. 3
I All three types of research suffer from methodological difficulties that
reduce the conclusiveness of their results. In general, animal studies do
not provide conclusive results because of the many inferences that must be
made in extrapolating from animal study results to effects on humans.
Animal studies involve giving animals extremely large doses of the
substance in question in order to maximize the chances of producing a
significant impact upon a large number of the animal population exposed
to the toxin." Thus, in order to determine the typical effects on
humans, researchers must first extrapolate from high-dose effects to low-
dose effects in animals, and then estimate the low-dose effects on human
beings." The combination of inferences creates considerable
uncertainty.
151 (1993) (concluding, based on rat experiments, that "the probability exists that silicone-gel is able
to mediate an auto-immune reaction"); Jerome S. Nosanchuk, Injected Dim ethylpolysiloxane Fluid: A
Study of Antibody and Histologic Response, 42 PLASTIC & RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 562, 563-65
(1968) (finding modular inflammation in animals receiving silicone injections); R.H. Rigdon & Alfred
Dricks, Reaction Associated With a Silicone Rubber Gel: An Experimental Study, 9 J. BIOMEDICAL
MATERIALS RES. 645, 645 (1975) (concluding that the injection of silicone oil and a partly oxidized
catalyst into mice, rats, and rabbits caused an inflammatory reaction).
122. See Frank B. Vasey et al., Clinical Findings in Symptomatic Women with Silicone Breast
Implants, 24 SEMINARS ARTHRITIS & RHEUMTISM 22, 22 (Supp. 1, 1994) (citing 21 case studies
showing a connection between connective-tissue disease and silicone breast implants).
123. See, e.g., Carin E. Dugowson et al., Silicone Breast Implants and Risk for Rheumatoid
Arthritis, 35 ARTHRITIS & RHEUMATISM S66, S66 (1992) (finding no increased risk for rheumatoid
arthritis among women with silicone breast implants); H.J. Englert & P. Brooks, Scleroderma and
Augmentation Mammoplasty-A Causal Relationship?, 24 AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND J. MED. 74,
74 (1994) (finding no association between silicone breast implants and subsequent development of
scleroderma); Sherine E. Gabriel et al., Risk of Connective-Tissue Diseases and Other Disorders After
Breast Implantation, 330 NEw ENO. J. MED. 1697, 1700 (1994) [hereinafter Gabriel et al., Risk of
Connective-Ti ssue Diseases] (finding no statistically significant elevation in the relative risk of
connective-tissue diseases among women with breast implants); Sherine E. Gabriel et al., Silicone-
Containing Breast Implants and Connective Tissue Diseases: A Population-Based Retrospective Cohort
Study, 36 ARTHRITIS & RHEUMATISM S70, S70 (1994) (reporting no increase in risk for connective-
tissue diseases in women with silicone breast implants); John A. Goldman et al., Breast Implants Are
Not Associated with an Excess of Connective Tissue Disease, 35 ARTHRrrIs& RHEUMATISM S65, S65
(1992) (finding no correlation between breast implants and connective-tissue disease in rheumatology
patients); F.M. Wigley et al., Augmentation Mammoplasiy in Patients with Systemic Sclerosis: Data
from the Baltimore SclerodermaResearch Center and Pittsburgh SclerodermaData Bank, 35 ARTHRITIS
& RHEuMATISM S46, 846 (1992) (failing to establish evidence that silicone breast implants increased
the risk of scleroderma).
124. CARL F. CRANOR, REGULATING TOXIC SUBSTANCES: A PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THE
LAW 15 (1993); Sanders, supra note 12, at 20.
125. See CRANOR, supra note 124, at 17-21; Green, supra note 25, at 654-56; Sanders, supra note
12, at 20-21.
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Because they involve a relatively small number of persons exposed to
a substance, case studies cannot provide conclusive evidence. Due to their
small scale, their results may be purely coincidental rather than a reflection
of any causal mechanism."
Epidemiological studies suffer from a number of problems that make
them inconclusive. First, epidemiological studies are generally unable to
detect small increases in the risk of harmful effects from a substance,
especially if the background risks of the same harmful effects are extremely
low."z  Second, epidemiological studies typically lack follow-up times
long enough to ensure that diseases with long latency periods are
discovered. 1" Third, epidemiological studies may suffer from a number
of biases such as selection bias, which occurs when the exposed group is
selected in a way that makes it more or less susceptible to disease for
reasons independent of exposure; diagnostic bias, which occurs when the
disease in question is not accurately determined; exposure bias, which is
the danger of selecting a study population especially likely or unlikely to
have been exposed to the disease; and recall bias, which is the tendency of
those who are in a study to recall incorrectly whether they were exposed
to the agent being studied. 29 Fourth, epidemiological studies may be
flawed because of the presence of unaccounted-for confounders-
undiscovered factors that independently affect disease rates in the studied
population.13
C. The Breast Implant Litigation and a Hypothetical Lawsuit
Against this background, suppose a woman who received silicone
breast implants brings suit against the manufacturer on behalf of her child,
whom she breast-fed and who now suffers from a disease of the esophagus
that makes it difficult for the child to swallow and results in digestive
disorders. The case turns on scientific testimony about whether silicone
126. Green, supra note 25, at 658; see also Jorge Sinchez-Guerrero et al., Silicone Breast
Implants and Rheumatic Diseases: Clinical, Immunologic, and Epidemiologic Studies, 37 ARTHRTms
& RHEUMATISM 158, 165-66 (1994) (attributing the failure of most studies to identify a "consistent
pattern of immune response [to silicone gel breast implants]" to "inadequate sample size").
127. Green, supra note 25, at 653. The recent Mayo Clinic epidemiological study made this point
explicit in noting its limited power to detect an increased risk of rare connective-tissue diseases such
as systemic sclerosis: "Indeed, we calculated that it would require a sample of 62,000 women with
implants and 124,000 women without implants, followed for an average of 10 years each, for a
doubling of the relative risk of this condition to be detected among womenwith implants, assuming that
the annual incidence of systemic sclerosis is 1.6 cases in 100,000 women." Gabriel et al., Risk of
Connective-7-ssue Diseases, supra note 123, at 1701.
128. See Shanna H. Swan, Epidemiology of Silicone-Related Disease, 24 SEIWNARs ARTHRMS &
RHEUMATISM 38, 41-42 (1994) (criticizing two epidemiological studies for inadequate follow-up).
129. Green, supra note 25, at 649-51; see Swan, supra note 128, at 40 (noting the many possible
sources of bias in any study design).
130. Green, supra note 25, at 651.
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implants cause this disorder in children who were breast-fed by mothers
with implants. The plaintiff seeks to put on experts who will testify that,
to a reasonable medical certainty, the implants cause the disorder, and the
defendant seeks to put on experts who will testify that, to an equally
reasonable medical certainty, the implants do not cause the disorder.
To properly perform the gatekeeping function assigned to her by
Daubert, the trial judge must assess the studies that provide the basis for
the various experts' testimony not to determine whether the studies support
the conclusions to which the experts plan to testify, but to decide whether
the studies constitute genuine scientific knowledge as defined in Daubert.
The admissibility decision should not turn on the judge's own evaluation
of the relationship between the strength or content of the expert's opinion
and the strength or content of the research on which it is based."'
Daubert specifically assigns the task of identifying any deficiency in the
support for an expert witness's conclusions to "[v]igorous cross-
examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on
the burden of proof."13 The admissibility determination must "focus
... solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions they
generate. "133
The plaintiff seeks to introduce scientific expert testimony based on
case studies made by Dr. Jeremiah Levine and Dr. Norman T. lowitel
131. Contrast the judge's admissibility decision with a decision on the sufficiency of evidence.
A judge might evaluate the adequacy of support for an expert's conclusions on causation in deciding
motions for summary judgment, directed verdict, or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. When
considering such motions, it is appropriate for the judge to consider sufficiency of evidence. If the
basis for an expert's opinion is unduly flimsy, a court could judge one party's expert testimony
insufficient to support a verdict for that side and grant the motion against that party, assuming no other
evidence sufficiently supports the party's case. This would be an unusual outcome in a mass exposure
case, in which questions of causation are usually left to thejury. But see In re Agent Orange Prod.
Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1259-60 (C.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that summary judgment for the
defendant was proper because the plaintiff had failed to meet the burden of proving causation), affd,
818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
132. Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2798 (1993).
133. Id. at 2797. When it comes to testability, the object of this focus is a bit obscure. Is the trial
judge to ask whether case studies are testable? Strictly speaking, this question makes little sense. It
is hypotheses, not methods, that are testable-subject to confirmation or falsification through
experimentation. Speaking more precisely, the question could mean one of three things. It could mean
that thejudge should ask whether case studies proceed by testing hypotheses, or it could mean that the
judge should ask whether case studies generate testable hypotheses, or it could mean that the judge
should check for both.
The third alternative best serves the goal of distinguishing respectable science from crank
science. Respectable science both tests hypotheses and generates hypotheses. Practically any method
or theory can generate testable hypotheses-a seer staring into a crystal ball may be inspired to
formulate predictions that can be confirmed or falsified. What is distinctive about genuine science is
that it generates hypotheses through experimentation that tests prior hypotheses. This cycle of
hypothesizing and experimenting lies at the heart of the empiricist vision.
134. Jeremiah J. Levine & Norman T. Ilowite, Sclerodermalike EsophagealDisease in Children
Breast-Fed by Mothers with Silicone Breast Implants, 271 JAMA 213 (1994). Scleroderma is a
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Levine and Ilowite examined eleven children born to women with silicone
breast implants. Of the eight who were breast-fed, six suffered from the
esophageal disease. 135  The physicians concluded that the children's
problems could be caused by silicone itself, by other by-products of the
implants, or by the mother's antibodies-developed in reaction to the
implants-transmitted via breast milk."36  The doctors also stated that
because the children in the study come from four families, genetic factors
cannot be excluded as causes despite the rarity of inherited sclero-
derma.137 Finally, Levine and Ilowite concluded:
The true incidence of this disorder among breast-fed children is
unknown and cannot be estimated from our study because of
selection bias. Studies examining greater numbers of BFSI [breast-
fed silicone implant] children are needed to confirm these results and
to determine the long-term outcome of these children. 3
A trial judge deciding whether to admit testimony based on the Levine
and Ilowite case studies must decide whether case studies are a permissible
methodology according to Daubert 9 She must consider testability, rate
of error, peer review and publication, and general acceptance.
Case studies fulfill the criterion of testability; they follow the
empiricist cycle of experimentally testing hypotheses to generate additional
experimentally testable hypotheses. Levine and ilowite's case studies tested
the hypothesis that "breast-fed children of mothers with silicone implants
are at increased risk for the development 6f sclerodermalike esophageal
involvement compared with children not exposed to silicone implants."" 4
They did so by examining a group of children with gastrointestinal
problems. Some children's mothers had implants, while other children's
mothers did not.' Among the children of the women with implants,
some had been breast-fed, some bottle-fed. 42 The esophageal disease
afflicted only children breast-fed by mothers with silicone breast
rheumatic disease that causes thickening of the skin and has been linked to exposure to silicone through
silicone breast implants. Id. at 213. Some of the children in the Levine and Ilowite study suffered
from a sclerodermalike disease of the esophagus that made it difficult for them to swallow. Id. at 215.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 216.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786,2796 (1993) (requiring
judges to make a preliminary assessment of whether the methodology is scientifically valid and whether
that methodology properly can be applied to the facts at issue).
140. Levine & Ilowite, supra note 134, at 216.
141. Id. at 213.
142. Id.
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implants. 3  The study generated-or regenerated-the hypothesis it
tested. That is, the authors concluded that based on their results, the
hypothesis merits further testing. This is a fruitful outcome.'" Levine
and Ilowite's research fulfills the testability criterion. The study also meets
two more of the Daubert factors: it appeared in a peer-reviewed journal
and followed a method that enjoys legitimacy in the scientific community.
Therefore, it would seem that a trial judge should admit testimony based
on Levine and Ilowite's work.
Although admissible, Levine and Ilowite's case studies are hardly
conclusive on the issue of causation, as the authors themselves re-
cognize. 45 Cognizant of the dangers of cross-examination, our hypo-
thetical plaintiff seeks to introduce additional evidence to bolster her child's
claim. Although to date no animal or epidemiological studies specifically
address the links between silicone breast implants, breast-feeding, and
sclerodermalike disease in children, some studies address the more general
issue of the association between silicone implants and various connective-
tissue disorders, including scleroderma. 1"
In 1993, Dr. John Naim and colleagues published a study investigating
the hypothesis that silicone provokes immune responses.147 The study
demonstrated that when rats were injected with silicone and a known
antigen (a substance that provokes an immune response), the mixture
provoked a strong antibody response."' Because the level of the known
antigen was too low to produce such response by itself, the researchers
concluded that silicone may act as an adjuvant, stimulating immune
response when combined with other immune-provoking shbstances 49
The authors recommended further investigation of this hypothesis."5
If the plaintiff whose child has suffered esophageal disease seeks to
introduce scientific testimony based on the Naim study,' it should be
admitted under Daubert. The study empirically tested a hypothesis and
generated a further one; it appeared in a peer-reviewed journal; and,
143. Id. at 215.
144. On the revised empiricist view of science, fruitfulness distinguishes worthwhile science from
poor science. See text accompanying notes 60-72.
145. Levine & Ilowite, supra note 134, at 216.
146. For present purposes, I am going to assume that these studies meet the relevance requirement
articulated in Daubert despite the somewhat attenuated connection between the studies and the facts of
the hypothetical case.
147. Naim et al., supra note 121, at 151.
148. Id. at 153-54.
149. Id. at 157.
150. Id. at 160.
151. Since one of Levine and Ilowite's postulated hypotheses developed on the basis of their case
studies is that antibodies produced by women with implants are transmitted to their children through
breast milk, the Naim study bears on the hypothetical plaintiff's case.
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although the general relevance of animal studies to human health is difficult
to ascertain, they are a generally accepted research methodology. The
research fulfills three of the four factors discussed in Daubert; this should
suffice for admissibility.
The defendant-manufacturer in our hypothetical lawsuit seeks to admit
testimony based on a recently published large-scale epidemiological
study," the first epidemiological study of the effects of silicone breast
implants.' 53 Its authors reportedly found no evidence of an association
between breast implants and connective-tissue disorders including sclero-
derma.' The authors, however, do not regard the study as conclusive
on the issue of the toxicity of silicone implants and urge additional research
on the question.'55
This epidemiological study, like the other two discussed above, meets
three of the four Daubert criteria and merits admission. Gabriel and her
colleagues tested a hypothesis and regenerated it. Through a comparative
survey of the health records of women with and without silicone breast
implants, the authors tested for a statistical correlation between receiving
implants and developing connective-tissue disorders. 56 This empirical
process generated the conclusion that more rigorous epidemiological studies
are needed to test whether a connection between implants and connective-
tissue disorder exists. 57 Before publication in a refereed journal, the
152. Gabriel et al., Risk of Connective-7ssue Diseases, supra note 123.
153. See Marcia Angell, Do Breast Implants Cause Systemic Disease?, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1748 (1994) (contending that before the Gabriel study "there ha[d] been almost no reliable evidence
bearing on the subject" of purported links between silicone gel breast implants and connective-tissue
disorders). Since the publication of this study, the findings of two other epidemiological studies have
been presented to the American College of Rheumatology. See Philip J. Hilts, 2 Studies Find No
Breast-Implant Tie to Connective-7"ssue Illness, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1994, at A23 (reporting the
findings of a study conducted by Dr. Marc C. Hochberg and another by researchers at the Harvard
Medical School). These studies did not detect an association between nonruptured implants and
connective-tissue disorders. Id. Due to sample size, one of the studies, according to its author, would
not detect an increase in risk created by the implants unless the increase were 70% or more. Id.
154. Gabriel et al., Risk of Connective-Tissue Diseases, supra note 123, at 1700. Scleroderma
is sometimes called systemic sclerosis, as it is in Gabriel's study. Other connective-tissue disorders
includerheumatoid arthritis, lupus, Sjigren's syndrome, and arthritis. Id. at 1697. The breast implant
global settlement includes compensation for women diagnosed with systemic sclerosis/seleroderma,
systemic lupus erythematosus, Atypical Neurological Disease Syndrome, mixed connective-tissue
disease/Overlap Syndrome, polymyositis/dermatomyositis, Primary Sj5gren's Syndrome, Atypical
Connective Tissue Disease, Atypical Rheumatic Syndrome, and nonspecific autoimmune condition.
Breast Implant Litigation Settlement Notice at 1216-23, Lindsey v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Silicone
Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig.), No. CV 92-P-10000-S, Civ. A. No. CV94-P-1 1558-S (N.D.
Ala. Sept. 16, 1994).
155. Gabriel et al., Risk of Connective-Tissue Diseases, supra note 123, at 1697-98. The authors
note the methodological shortcomings of their study, which are the usual problems confronted by
epidemiological research. Id. at 1701-02.
156. Id. at 1697.
157. See id. at 1701 (predicting that the results of ongoing studies will help determine the link
between silicone breast implants and connective-tissue disorder).
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study received extensive peer review, resulting in extensive revisions.15
Finally, a significant number of scientists accept the methods of
epidemiological research.
D. Revised Empiricism Realized, Recurrent Strong Uncertainty
Recognized
As the foregoing applications illustrate, Daubert's interpretation of
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 leads to the admission of scientific expert
testimony on both sides of the cause-in-fact issue in our hypothetical case.
The factfinder will hear testimony that maternal implants can cause
sclerodermalike disease in breast-fed infants and testimony that implants do
not cause scleroderma at all. If each side's attorneys are skillful cross-
examiners, the factfinder will also receive some information about the
underlying basis of each expert's opinion. Taken all together, the
testimony will reveal that scientists have not reached any firm conclusions
regarding the causal powers of silicone breast implants; researchers have
drawn extremely tentative conclusions in opposite directions depending on
their subdisciplines.
In this subpart, I address two interesting implications of the above
hypothetical case. First, the state of scientific research, and therefore the
scientific expert testimony admissible under Daubert, is just what the
revised empiricist would expect it to be. Second, this testimony provides
an insufficient basis for concluding either that the mother's implants did not
cause the child's esophageal disease or that they did." 9 This is a specific
case of a recurrent type of uncertainty in which the reasonable factfinder
will be unable to conclude that it is more likely than not that a litigated
substance is unsafe or that it is more likely than not that the substance is
safe. Procedurally speaking, whenever strong uncertainty about general
causation exists, the party bearing the burden of proof on the causation
question should lose. In the next section of this Article, I will show how
this sort of strong uncertainty systematically interferes with realizing the
goals of tort law.
158. Angell, supra note 153, at 1749 ("The paper by Gabriel and colleagues was reviewed by
three outside experts and twice by one of our statistical consultants, and it was revised extensively.").
159. In Hopkins v. Dow Coming Corp., 33 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1994), the Ninth Circuit sustained
a jury verdict finding Dow liable for the plaintiff's mixed connective-tissue disease. The court did not
reach the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence on the question of causation; the opinion addressed
only the admissibility of plaintiffs' expert testimony on the issue. Id. This may have been because,
as the plaintiffs argued, Dow failed to preserve an objection to the sufficiency of the evidence on
causation when it failed to move for directed verdict on this ground. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee
at 55-56, Hopkins (No. 92-16132). Furthermore, it appears that unlike the hypothetical defendant
discussed in the text, Dow did not present expert testimony rebutting the plaintiff's evidence of
causation; instead, Dow relied solely on its objections to the admissibility of plaintiff's expert
testimony. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 44-50, Hopkins (No. 92-16132).
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Revised empiricism teaches us to regularly expect strong uncertainty
about causation in mass exposure litigation." According to revised
empiricism, science is dynamic, non-dogmatic, theory-dependent, and
empirical. The science presented in the hypothetical case possesses these
characteristics. The testimony indicates that the science investigating the
causal powers of silicone is still developing, with all researchers drawing
only tentative conclusions and calling for further study. Depending upon
the scientific discipline in which they work, different researchers urge the
pursuit of the negative or the positive hypothesis on the causal connection
between silicone implants and disease in humans. Clinicians like Levine
and nowite, educated to place weight on clinical experiences with patients,
conclude on the basis of such experiences that the hypothesis that implants
cause esophageal disease is sufficiently likely to be true that it warrants
further study. 1' John Naim, an animal researcher working from the
background assumption that animal effects have implications for human
health, concludes that the effects of silicone on rats tend to suggest a
connection between implants and autoimmune disease. 62 Sherine Gabriel
and other epidemiologists, schooled in a correlative understanding of
causation, conclude that statistical evidence, although not wholly reliably
gathered, reinforces the hypothesis that breast implants do not cause
autoimmune disorders in humans."e While these scientists all regard
their findings as tentative, they also judge that the experimental research
in their respective disciplines suggests the correct understanding of the
causal powers of silicone.
The testimony in the esophageal disease hypothetical is insufficient to
provide a basis for a conclusive finding on causation. The scientists whose
studies provide the basis for the fictional experts' testimony do not commit
to firm positions on the question because at this stage, competing scientific
evidence points in different directions. If scientists cannot draw firm
conclusions, the jury cannot do so in any principled fashion, even if the
expert witnesses claim to have conclusive opinions on the question of
causation. A jury confronted with conflicting scientific testimony, none of
160. This may be especially true in cases such as Daubert which involve suspected teratogens
(chemicals known to cause limb reduction defects). On remand of Daubert, Judge Alex Kozinski
noted:
[S]cientists simply do not know how teratogens . .. do their damage: They cannot
reconstruct the biological chain of events that leads from an expectant mother's ingestion
of a teratogenic substance to the stunted development of a baby's limbs. Nor do they
know what it is about teratogens that causes them to have this effect.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1311-12 (9th Cir. 1995).
161. Levine& flowite, supra note 134, at 216.
162. Naim et al., supra note 121, at 151.
163. See, e.g., Gabriel et al., Risk of Connective-7ssueDiseases, supra note 123, at 1697 (finding
.no association between breast implants and the connective-tissue diseases... that were studied").
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which rests on scientific research that even purports to be conclusive,
might decide to find one way or the other on the question of causation. In
such cases, however, we should be suspicious of the accuracy of the jury's
choice. Scientists' genuine uncertainty renders it a matter of luck whether
the jury answers the causation question correctly."
We provide juries with expert testimony in areas requiring expertise
because we doubt that jurors can accurately decide matters of fact in such
areas without assistance. We expect the jury's conclusions to piggyback
on those of the experts. In a case in which the experts have not reached
strong conclusions, the jury cannot meet this expectation. Jurors will be
left to their own devices, forced to draw conclusions in situations in which
those with superior knowledge and understanding of the field decline to do
SO.
The situation confronting a jury in a case like the esophageal disease
hypothetical is not one in which the jury is asked to make a probabilistic
judgment on the basis of competing statistical information from a variety
of experts. Animal studies and case studies do not straightforwardly
provide probabilistic information about causation. Even if, theoretically
speaking, any information presented affects .the probability of the truth of
a hypothesis about causation, the jury is not in a position to compute that
probability. To do so would require extensive background knowledge of
the likelihood of the truth of that hypothesis without the addition of the
new information. Laypeople do not possess this background knowledge.
Furthermore, even with that knowledge, it can be extremely difficult to
decide how new information affects the likelihood of the truth of the
hypothesis. This is one reason why scientists, who may arguably possess
the necessary background knowledge, do not draw strong conclusions from
isolated research results."
164. The problem is the same whether jurors are presented with conflicting scientific opinions,
all couched conclusively, or with individual testimony, expressing uncertainty: the jury has no
principled way of deciding the underlying issue. This is sometimes discussed in terms of the jury's
inability to accurately assess the credibility of experts. See Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991
Wis. L. REv. 1113, 1182 (1991) (stating that the problem with expert testimony is that "[w]e call
expert witnesses to testify about matters that are beyond the ordinary understanding of lay people...
and then we ask lay judges and jurors to judge their testimony"); Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and
Complex Cases: Taking Stock After Twelve Years, in VERDIcT: ASSESSING THE CML JURY SYSTEM
181, 202 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) ("A ... difficulty the jurors had in some cases was
understanding esoteric facts when the parties offered conflicting expert testimony from apparently
credible sources."). But it can also be understood as a result of the jury's inability to independently
assess the meaning and plausibility of the substance of the testimony. Richard Lempert suggests that
when experts present firm but conflicting conclusions, credibility is not the important question because
in such cases it is likely that both positions are reasonably maintained. Id. at 194. When this is so,
a case presents the problem of strong uncertainty.
165. I am arguing that a resort to Bayesianism will not resolve the practical problems typically
raised by scientific evidence in mass toxic tort litigation. For a similar argument addressed to another
legal context, see Richard Lempert, Some Caveats Concerning DNA as Criminal Identification
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A case like the esophageal disease hypothetical exemplifies the strong
uncertainty about causation that testimony admissible under Daubert will
make apparent. Of course, one example does not establish the contention
that this situation will increasingly be the norm. To support this claim, I
have indicated the general characteristics that the example illustrates,
characteristics which suggest that strong uncertainty about general causation
is a recurrent feature of mass exposure litigation. My discussion sets aside
a number of important issues pertaining to whether the use of expert
witnesses provides juries with an accurate sense of the state of knowledge
in the relevant field. The ways in which lawyers hire, prepare, examine,
and cross-examine expert witnesses all arguably impede- juries' under-
standing of the information expert evidence is supposed to help them
comprehend.1" Even if we eliminated all the problems posed by these
practices, the difficulty of recurrent strong uncertainty about causation
would nonetheless persist as long as we employ admissibility standards that
promote the accurate presentation of scientific knowledge. Suppose we
became confident that juries were receiving scientific expert testimony
undistorted by trial lawyers' tricks. Revised empiricism leads us to expect
that in a significant number of cases even undistorted testimony would not
provide a reasonable basis for concluding that it is more probable than not
that a substance is safe or unsafe.16 This is because when strong
uncertainty about causation exists, it is a product of science, not a product
of how science is presented at trial. No matter how perfectly science is
presented, the problem will remain.
Evidence: With Thanks to the ReverendBayes, 13 CARDozo L. REv. 303, 331 (1991) (suggesting that
although a Bayesian approach to presenting DNA evidence might make some mathematical sense, it
would not necessarily promote the jury's understanding of the role and relevance of DNA testing in
criminal identification).
166. Samuel Gross has offered an account of why expert evidence "is frequently misleading,
uninterpretable or unreliable .... . Gross, supra note 164, at 1131. Gross explains that the scope
of permissible expert testimony, the expert's interest in pleasing the lawyerwho has hired her, and the
opportunity to shop for a confident, charismatic expert all contaminate the expert selection process.
Id. at 1133. The importance of careful preparation of experts "pushes the expert to identify with the
lawyers on her side and to become a partisan member of the litigation team.' Id. at 1139. On direct
examination, lawyers have an incentive to encourage experts "to compromise accuracy to achieve
clarity, and to favor simple assertions over complex explanations." Id. at 1164. Finally, the broad
scope of permissible questioning of experts during cross-examination allows the lawyer to confuse
finders of fact by "pickling] and choos[ing] whatever articles and books she wants from the entire
library of a profession, showing] them to thewitness[,] and read[ing] selections or summariz[ing] their
conclusions for the jury-but never ask[ing] the expert for comments or opinions." Id. at 1170.
167. In fact, the esophageal disease hypothetical is an example of a case in which undistorted
scientific information fails to provide the basis for a conclusion one way or the other as to the toxicity
of the substance in question.
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V. Information About Causation and the Heart of Tort Law
Strong uncertainty about general causation strikes at the heart of the
tort system. To appreciate the threat, we need to clarify the relationship
between causation and the legal doctrine of tort law and the relationships
between that doctrine and tort law's objectives.
A. Tort Goals, Tort Doctrine, and Information About Causation
Tort law as we know it attempts to achieve three goals. 168 First, it
seeks to allocate resources to those who have been injured by unduly risky
conduct or products. Second, it aims to deter excessively risky conduct
and the manufacture of excessively risky products. Third, it tries to
expressively yoke victims of overly risky activity with their injurers by
requiring injurers to compensate those they have harmed."6
These three goals are related to one another. Tort law accomplishes
its deterrent effect by imposing liability on those who pose excessive risk
168. There is controversy over just what the goals of the tort system should be. Some legal
economists maintain that tort law should aim to minimize total accident costs by minimizing the sum
of the costs of carefulness and expected accident losses. See, e.g., STEvEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAw 7 (1987) (identifying the minimization of total accident costs as "the
social goal" of accident law). Other writers have suggested that tort law should serve both economic
and moral goals. E.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 16 (1970); JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 303 (1992). Some torts scholars have
argued that tort law should focus exclusively on requiring wrongdoers to make restitution to their
victims; these scholars have defined wrongdoing in a variety of ways. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein,
A Theory ofStrict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 151, 168, 168-69 (1973) ("[P]roof of the proposition
A hit B should be sufficient to establish a prima facie case of liability."); George P. Fletcher, Fairness
and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 543-51 (1972) (arguing that an individual injured
by a party engaged in nonreciprocal risk-taking activity is entitled to damages resulting from that
disproportionately risky activity). For present purposes, I plan to ignore this normative debate over
what the objectives of the tort system ought to be. I will specify what the current goals of tort are and
what the relationship between these goals and information about the causation of harm is. For now,
I will not concern myself with whether any or all of these goals are desirable or whether they can all
be served simultaneously and effectively through tort litigation.
169. I have deliberately described this expressive objective as narrowly as possible, without
reference to correctivejustice. There are a variety of ways of interpreting correctivejustice. See, e.g.,
2 ARISTOTLE, Nlchomachean Ethics, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE V.4.1131625-.1132621,
at 1729, 1786-87 (Bollingen Series No. 71, Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984) (Revised Oxford Translation)
(characterizing rectificatory justice as the restoration of equality after one person has wrongfully gained
at the expense of another and construing gain to encompass the infliction of a wound or a slaying);
COLEMAN, supra note 168, at 318, 325, 303-28 (delineating three versions of corrective justice and
endorsing "a mixed conception," according to which "[c]orrective justice imposes on wrongdoers the
duty to repair the wrongful losses their conduct occasions, losses for which they are responsible');
Ernest J. Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 LAW & PHIL. 37, 58-60 (1983)
(arguing for a version of corrective justice emphasizing the unique moral responsibility to repair a loss
one has caused). However it is fleshed out, corrective justice is more full-blown than the narrow
expressive goal of yoking together wrongful injurers and their victims. Theories of corrective justice
tend to incorporate the narrower goal but add to it accounts of wrongfulness, duty, loss, and gain.
These embellishments may be necessary to explain or justify the traditional commitment to yoking
injurer and victim, but they are not necessary to specify that objective.
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to others and injure them; it accomplishes its allocative goal by shifting the
resources of excessive-risk-creators to their victims; it achieves its
expressive goal by requiring a payment of damages from tortfeasor to
victim. Nonetheless, the goals are conceptually and practically distinct.
Resources for victims of unduly risky conduct or products could come
from a variety of sources, not just the party who created the risk. Fines
and jail sentences could be used to deter inordinate risk-taking. Victims
and injurers could be yoked together by requiring formal public apologies
from excessive-risk-takers to those they have harmed. Contemporary tort
law, however, rejects these alternative means to its ends, relying instead
primarily on two liability regimes, negligence and strict products liability,
to determine when a defendant should pay monetary damages to a plaintiff.
Understanding the relationship between causation and the traditional
fundamental goals of the tort system requires an exact understanding of the
role of information about causation within the law of negligence and strict
products liability. First, consider an action for negligence. The plaintiff
bears the burden of establishing that the defendant breached the duty of
care, that the breach was the cause-in-fact and proximate cause of her
injury, and that the plaintiff incurred damages as a result of the injury.70
Information about causation is important to two of these elements: cause-in-
fact and breach.
The connection between information about causation and cause-in-fact
is obvious. In order to establish that the injury would not have happened
but for the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff must have information about
the causal powers of the defendant's conduct. The connection between
information about causation and breach is more subtle. One of the ways
tort law allows a plaintiff to establish that the defendant has breached the
duty of care is to allow the plaintiff to show that the defendant's conduct
was inefficiently risky-that the costs of the harms risked by the conduct,
discounted by the likelihood of the harms occurring, exceeded the costs of
taking precautions against these harms.' Information about causation
is critical to arguments based on the putative inefficiency of the defendant's
conduct. To establish inefficiency, the plaintiff must produce evidence of
the harms risked by the defendant's conduct. This requires information
about the causal powers of that conduct, so that the plaintiff can establish
what the consequences of the conduct could have been and how likely the
170. W. PAGE KEErON ET AL., PROssER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (5th ed.
1984).
171. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). The plaintiffmay
also show breach in certain cases by arguing that the defendant's conduct violated custom among those
similarly situated, KEErON ET AL., supra note 170, § 33, or by arguing that the defendant's conduct
violated a criminal statute designed for the protection of those in the plaintiff's position, id. § 36.
Information about causation is irrelevant to arguments based on custom or statutes.
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various consequences were. Without this information, the plaintiff cannot
perform the calculus of risk.
In a strict products liability action, the plaintiff bears the burden of
showing that the defendant's product was defective so as to be unreason-
ably dangerous and was a cause-in-fact of plaintiff's injury." As with
a negligence claim, the relationship between information about causation
and cause-in-fact is obvious. The relationship between this information and
defect is more subtle.
In mass exposure litigation, plaintiffs typically argue that an entire
product line is defective by virtue of its design (as opposed to arguing that
a flaw in construction rendered one specific unit of the product unreason-
ably dangerous). Most jurisdictions recognize three types of design defect
claims. First, a product may be defective because as designed, it fails to
perform in accordance with ordinary consumer expectations. 7 Second,
a product may be defective because the risks created by its design outweigh
the product's utility.174 Third, a failure to provide an adequate warning
of the dangers associated with the product may be classified as a defect in
its design.'75 All three approaches require information about causation.
172. DAVID A. FISCHER& WILLIAM POWERS, JR., PRODUCTS LIABILITY: CASES AND MATERIALS
461 (2d ed. 1994).
173. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (1965) ("Defective condition. The
rule stated in this Section applies... where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in
a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer. . . ."); id. § 402A cmt. i ("Unreasonably
dangerous.... The article ... must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it .... ).
174. E.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443,456 (Cal. 1978); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.
v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410, 413 (Colo. 1986); Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 970 (Mass.
1978); Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 386 A.2d 816, 827 (NJ. 1978); Knitz v. Minster Mach.
Co., 432 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Ohio), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982). See also John W. Wade, On
the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. UJ. 825, 835 (1973).
Some states apply a modified risk-utility analysis. See, e.g., Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d
876, 880 (Ariz. 1985) (applying the risk-utility test only in situations in which the consumer-expectation
test fails to provide a clear answer); Lamkin v. Towner, 563 N.E.2d 449, 458 (Ill. 1990) (requiring
the plaintiff to present evidence of a safer alternative design); Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg.
Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 682-83 (W. Va. 1979) (adopting "[tihe standard of reasonable safeness" and
limiting the role of risk-utility analysis to "setting the general contours of relevant expert testimony
concerning the defectiveness of the product").
175. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965) ("Directions or warning. In
order to prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller may be required to give
directions or warning ... as to its use."). Many courts have held that for the plaintiff to establish
inadequate warning as a design defect, he must prove that the defendant-manufacturer knew or should
have known of the risk or hazard about which it failed to warn, incorporating a negligence inquiry into
the design defect theory. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th
Cir. 1973) (applying Texas law), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). But see Beshada v. Johns-
Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 546 (N.J. 1982) (holding that a manufacturer's inability to
know of dangers associated with exposure to asbestos does not constitute a defense to a strict products
liability action). Beshada's holding has since been limited to the specific facts of that case. Feldman
v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 387-88 (NJ. 1984).
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To show that a product by design failed to perform as an ordinary
consumer would have expected, we have to know how the product actually
performed. We need to know what its causal effects on the consumer were
before we can decide whether these outcomes conflict with ordinary
consumer expectations. Likewise, making a risk-utility assessment requires
sufficient information about the causal effects of a product's design to show
whether the positive effects or the negative effects dominate. 76 Note that
the information required here resembles the information necessary to
establish breach in a negligence action by using the calculus of risk.
Finally, information about causation is relevant to determining the
adequacy of a warning. Before we can decide whether a manufacturer
provided adequate warning of a danger allegedly associated with its
product, we need to know whether the product causes that problem, and
this requires information about the product's causal powers.
To understand the relationship between tort doctrine involving
causation and tort goals, we need to appreciate how determinations of
cause-in-fact, breach, and design defect serve the fundamental objectives
of tort. I will consider each doctrinal element's function in turn.
Establishing that the defendant's conduct or product was the cause-in-
fact of the plaintiff's injury serves all three of the fundamental goals of tort
law. To allocate resources to those who have been harmed by undue risk-
taking, we need to know how an injured person received his injuries. This
is a necessary step in establishing that his injury actually arose from an
unduly risky activity. To effectively deter overly risky activity, tort
liability must give people incentive to refrain from causing injury by such
activity. By premising liability on a showing of causation, tort law
motivates those people who are in a position to avoid the imposition of
harm to do so. Finally, causation defines the relationship between an
injurer and her victim: the victim is specifically the injurer's victim, rather
than just any victim, precisely because the injurer caused that specific
victim's harm."
Establishing breach by a calculus of risk serves two of tort law's
goals. Tort's allocative goal is a restricted one, limited to those injured as
a result of someone else's excessively risky activity. In a negligence
In addition to its role in a design defect case, adequacy of warning may be an issue in a
negligence claim. In this posture, the question of adequacy pertains to the issue of breach. For the
relationship between information about causation and breach, see supra text accompanying note 171.
176. This will be true regardless of which party bears the burden of proof on the risk-utility
question. In some jurisdictions, a plaintiff alleging design defect who establishes cause-in-fact thereby
shifts to the defendant the burden of demonstrating the safety of the product according to a risk-utility
test. Barker, 573 P.2d at 455.
177. Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 407, 409-10, 414-16
(1987).
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action, breach is the measure of undue riskiness. Determining that the
plaintiff's injuries resulted from the defendant's breach ensures that the
plaintiff merits aid. Tort's deterrence goal is also limited: tort seeks to
deter only inordinately risky conduct, not all risky conduct. Demonstrating
breach through the calculus of risk respects this limitation. By showing
that the risks of the defendant's conduct outweighed its benefits, the
plaintiff proves that the defendant's behavior created an excessive risk of
harm, not just some risk of harm.
In a strict products liability action, demonstrating that a product is
defective so as to be unreasonably dangerous serves the allocative and
deterrence functions of tort law. Tort law does not attempt to shift
resources to every person injured by a product. The goal is to shift
resources to those injured by products that pose excessive risk, judged
either by a consumer expectations test or by a risk-utility analysis.
Likewise, tort law does not attempt to deter the manufacture of all products
or all products somewhat likely to cause injury. Tort aims to deter
production of products that are excessively likely to cause undesirable
harm. Tort law provides correct incentives by allowing manufacturers to
escape liability if they can show that their design satisfies ordinary
consumer expectations, is appropriately risky, or properly advertises its
risks.
The more perfectly legal factfinders ascertain cause-in-fact, breach,
and design defect, the more likely it is that the current tort system will
meet all of its objectives. But of course legal factfinders cannot and do not
achieve perfection in these determinations. There are many reasons for
this. The one I will concentrate upon is strong uncertainty about general
causation, which I will argue is more problematic than other types of
uncertainty sometimes encountered in mass exposure litigation.
B. The Impact of Different Kinds of Uncertainty About Causation
So far in this Article, I have been discussing strong uncertainty about
general causation. When faced with this type of uncertainty, it is not
possible to conclude that it is more likely than not that a substance is
harmful to humans, nor is it possible to conclude that it is more likely than
not that the substance is safe. Strong uncertainty about general causation
is more threatening to the traditional objectives of tort law than either
identity uncertainty about specific causation or probabilistic uncertainty
about specific causation, two other types of uncertainty about causation
sometimes encountered in mass exposure litigation.
Identity uncertainty about specific causation arises in cases involving
multiple defendants where each defendant has produced a substance that
has harmed people, but it is unclear which producer has .caused whose
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injuries.'78 Courts have devised a variety of solutions to this problem,
most of which focus on allocating liability among all the possible tort-
feasors, exempting only those who can establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that they did not cause the plaintiff's injury.79 Probabilistic
uncertainty about specific causation arises in cases in which it is known
that a substance causes a particular injury in a certain percentage of cases
of that injury, but it is not possible to distinguish the cases caused by the
substance from those caused by other factors."8 Courts have not modi-
fied traditional doctrine to address this type of uncertainty, although
scholars have recommended proportional liability as a solution.'
Defendant-manufacturers would be required to compensate injured parties
exposed to demonstrably toxic products in proportion to the established
likelihood that the substance caused the plaintiffs' injuries.
Both market-share and proportional liability depend upon the existence
of reliable, meaningful information about the toxicity of a litigated
substance. Market-share liability assumes that the plaintiff has carried the
burden of proof on the question of whether her injury was caused by the
substance even though she has not met the burden of showing which part-
icular defendant produced the particular batch to which she was exposed.
Proportional liability assumes that even if the plaintiff cannot meet the
traditional burden of proving that the defendant's conduct or product was
more than fifty percent likely to have caused her injury, she can establish,
with significant certainty, a specific probability that the defendant caused
her injury. For example, she can provide convincing evidence of a forty-
percent chance that the defendant's product injured her.
Premised on some significant degree of certainty about the causal
powers of a litigated substance, market-share and proportional-liability
schemes are able to further the traditional goals of tort, if not to
accomplish them fully. Market-share liability requires excessive-risk-
creators to compensate those who have been injured by the relevant kind
of overly risky activity. This satisfies tort's allocative goal by shifting
178. This is the case, for example, in DES litigation, in which plaintiffs could not identify which
of approximately 200 DES manufacturers made the specific dose that harmed them. See Sindell v.
Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 926-28, 931, 936-38 (Cal.) (concluding that the plaintiff could maintain
a cause of action against five DES manufacturers who produced a substantial percentage of the DES
marketed despite the fact that the plaintiff could not prove that any of the defendants produced the
specific dose taken by the plaintiff's mother), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
179. See id. at 937 (creating a market-share theory of recovery); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y.) (adopting the market-share theory in another DES case), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 944 (1989).
180. David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision
of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REv. 849, 855-59 (1984).
181. E.g., id. at 866, 859-66 ("[TIhe proportionality rule is ideally suited to the task of resolving
the problem of causal indeterminacy in mass exposure cases.").
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resources to those injured by'such activity. It also deters the production
of excessively toxic substances by making manufacturers internalize costs
associated with toxic products. Finally, market-share liability yokes
together injurers with victims of their type of injurious activity even though
the match is not based on a specific causal connection between the party
who actually inflicted the injury and the party who suffered it. This
expresses, to some degree, the connection between excessive risk creation,
injury, and reparation.
Proportional liability approaches tort law's deterrence goal more
nearly than it approaches the allocative and expressive goals. Ideally, a
liability scheme forces defendants to internalize all the costs of their
activities by requiring them to pay the total damages they inflicted. Rather
than cover any one injured person's total losses, however, defendants under
a proportional-liability scheme would pay the proportion of damages that
corresponds to the probability that their conduct or product caused the
plaintiffs' harms. If all those injured and exposed to the defendant's
product or conduct were to seek recovery, the defendant's total liability
would reflect the injury costs it had inflicted. This would deter defendants
from imposing excessive injury costs.
Proportional liability would also mean, however, that some plaintiffs
who had not in fact been injured by inordinately risky conduct or products
would receive tort awards. In those cases, injurers would not be linked
with the victims of (the relevant) injurious activity. Such outcomes would
fail to serve the allocative and expressive goals of tort. Without
proportional liability, though, these goals would be served even less.
Under proportional liability, some plaintiffs who have indeed been injured
by excessive-risk-creators receive resources from the relevant parties.
In the face of identity uncertainty about specific causation or
probabilistic uncertainty about specific causation, relatively minor
modifications of traditional tort rules permit significant accomplishment of
tort law's goals. Strong uncertainty about general causation is another
matter. Market-share and proportional-liability schemes approximate the
outcomes that the traditional tort system would yield if there were fuller
information about specific causation. Thus, they approximate the allocative
outcomes, deterrence, and expressive connection between injurer and
victim traditionally sought in tort. In contrast, strong uncertainty about
general causation makes it impossible to approximate the results the system
would reach with fuller information, and therefore makes it impossible to
accomplish tort law's goals reliably.
When mass exposure litigation results in strong uncertainty about
causation, it is impossible to tell whether any plaintiff was injured as a
result of excessively risky conduct or an unduly risky product. Reaching
a meaningful judgment on this question requires meaningful information
about the causal history of a plaintiff's injuries. If the scientific evidence
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warrants neither a conclusion that it is more likely than not that a substance
causes harm nor a conclusion that it is more likely than not that the
substance does not cause harm, a verdict in favor of a plaintiff or a group
of plaintiffs is not based on a meaningful determination of the causal
history of the plaintiffs' harms. The same point holds true for a verdict in
favor of the defendant: In the face of strong uncertainty about general
causation, a defendant's victory will not be based on a meaningful
determination that the defendant did not cause the plaintiffs' harms.
Traditional rules regarding the burden of proof reflect a willingness
to err on the side of failing to allocate resources to those who have been
injured by inordinately risky conduct or products. If a plaintiff cannot
show that it is more likely than not that a defendant's product or conduct
causes harm to humans and caused the plaintiff's harm in particular, a
verdict goes to the defendant. When there is recurrent strong uncertainty
about general causation, this procedural mechanism has a dramatically
pernicious effect on deterrence as well as on alocative outcomes.
Recurrent strong uncertainty about general causation prevents the law
from regularly imposing liability in mass exposure cases when the
defendant's action or product may in fact have created an excessive risk of
undesirable harm. Whether she brings suit in negligence or strict products
liability, if the plaintiff cannot meet the burden of proof on cause-in-fact,
her action will fail. Strong uncertainty about general causation will prevent
the plaintiff from meeting the burden. In such cases, a defendant will
avoid liability even if her conduct or product poses excessive risk. Under
current rules of procedure, even a perfectly functioning tort system will not
reliably promote optimal levels of safety: it will underdeter excessively
risky behavior. In fact, placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff creates
a perverse incentive for actors to foster strong uncertainty about general
causation, so as to escape liability whatever the actual causal powers of
their conduct or product. In other words, the current system, rather than
motivating actors to acquire sufficient information so as to align their
estimations of risk with the actual causal impact their products or conduct
will have, motivates actors to acquire only enough information about the
causal powers of their products or conduct to be able to demonstrate strong
uncertainty in the event of litigation.
Because recurrent strong uncertainty about general causation
repeatedly interferes heavily with identifying both victims and creators of
excessive risk, it will, of course, interfere heavily with pairing the two.
This defeats the expressive goal of tort law.
C. The Scientific Attitude Toward Uncertainty
For those who favor the law's adopting a scientific approach to
selecting information for factfinders to consider, it might seem appealing
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for the law to adopt a scientific attitude toward uncertainty about causation.
Since science and law gather information for different ultimate purposes,
however, it does not make sense for the two fields to respond identically
to uncertainty about matters of fact.
Law and science both seek correct factual information, but the two
enterprises have different interests in this information. At one level,
science pursues correct information simply to achieve a better under-
standing of the natural world. At another level, science seeks information
in order to predict-and, ultimately, to control-what happens in that
world. Regardless of which end-understanding or control-motivates a
scientist, the appropriate response to uncertainty is to delay reaching a final
conclusion until further research settles the issue. Likewise, it makes sense
to revisit a previously settled issue if further data or more sophisticated
theory casts doubt on the old conclusion. For science, these responses
make sense because closure at the expense of correctness has no value to
science. Understanding the natural world or predicting its behavior
reliably requires factually correct conclusions, but conclusiveness in and of
itself has no independent importance.
In law, the situation is different. Law pursues correct information in
order to settle disputes promptly, decisively, and justly.1" Each of these
goals is sometimes best served by deciding upon a final result in the face
of uncertainty about seemingly pivotal matters of fact. 1 3 Waiting for
further research can easily be counterproductive to law's ultimate purposes.
This is especially true in large-scale, high-stakes litigation such as mass
exposure lawsuits. Defendants in these cases typically face the prospect of
hundreds, or even thousands, of lawsuits and potentially bankrupting
liability exposure."' Often, plaintiffs face debilitating long-term illnesses
182. The Federal Rules of Evidence reflect this orientationtoward information: "These rules shall
be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and
promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be
ascertained and proceedings justly determined." FED. R. EVID. 102.
183. As Hart and McNaughton point out:
The law does not require absolute assurance of the perfect correctness of particular
decisions. While it is of course important that the court be right in its determinations of
fact, it is also important that the court decide the case when the parties ask for the
decision and on the basis of the evidence presented by the parties. A decision must be
made now, one way or the other. To require certainty or even near-certainty in such a
context would be impractical and undesirable. The law thus compromises.
Henry M. Hart & John T. McNaughton, Evidence and Inference in the Law, DAEDALUs, Fall 1958,
at 40, 45.
184. The Agent Orange litigation, for example, consolidated into a class action more than 600
separate actions originally filed by more than 15,000 named individuals. PETER H. SCHUcK, AGENT
ORANGE ON TRIAL 4 (1986). Four hundred additional cases were brought by plaintiffs who "opted-
out" of the class action. Id. In the Dalkon Shield case, 3.6 million women used the Dalkon Shield
intrauterine device. RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAw 11 (1991). After resolving 7,700 cases
at a cost of $260 million, id. at 23, the manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield, A.H. Robins Company,
Inc., filed for bankruptcy in federal court. Id. at 47.
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without easily available financial resources.1" Delaying already pro-
tracted litigation to await further scientific research would take a heavy toll
on both groups. Mass exposure defendants would find it even more diffi-
cult to keep their business affairs in good order if it took longer than it
already does to put a price tag on liability exposure. Even worthy
plaintiffs would probably have a difficult time finding legal representation
if payment of plaintiffs' attorneys' contingency fees could be delayed
indefinitely while the courts awaited scientific research. Indefinitely
staying results in mass exposure litigation harms societal interests as well
as the litigants'. Postponing a final outcome ties up the courts, attorneys,
and parties involved, making it difficult-if not impossible-for them to
move on and allocate their resources elsewhere. In law, in contrast to
science, closure and finality have value in their own right.186
VI. Conclusion
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow, the Court adopted admissibility standards
that reflect a contemporary philosophical understanding of science as a
Other defendants in mass exposure cases have sought protection in bankruptcy. Most notable
among these are asbestos manufacturers. See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 78 B.R. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 843 F.2d 636 (2d
Cir. 1988); In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1985); In re UNR Indus., 725 F.2d 1111 (7th
Cir. 1984) (all addressing issues arising in the bankruptcy proceedings of asbestos manufacturers faced
with enormous actual and potential liability exposure); Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass
TortLitigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 469, 478 n.38 (1994) (citing an annual report listing 17 companies
involved in asbestos litigation that reorganized or liquidated under the bankruptcy laws). When Johns-
Manville filed for bankruptcy, it was spending $2 million per month to litigate asbestos cases.
SCHUCK, supra, at 49. For discussion of the effects of the breast implant litigation upon implant
manufacturers, see supra text accompanying notes 88-118.
185. Many asbestos workers, for example, are mortally ill from cancer or severe respiratory
diseases but must wait years for resolution of their claims. Christopher F. Edley & Paul C. Weiler,
Asbestos: A Multi-Billion Dollar Crisis, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 383, 384 (1993). Dalkon Shield
recipients suffered a range of medical problems requiring immediate attention, including septic abortion,
pelvic inflammatory disease, perforation of the uterus, and ectopic pregnancies. SOBOL, supra note
184, at 11. For discussion of the health problems of breast implant recipients, see supra text
accompanying notes 81-85. Implant recipients have experienced difficulty in getting their first-party
insurers to pay for treatment of problems associated with the implants. Sandra G. Boodman, Breast
Implants: Now Women Are Having a Hard Tune Getting Them Out, WASH. POST, June 23, 1992,
Health, at 10.
186. Settlement practices-of both courts and litigants-testify to the premium placed on prompt,
decisive resolution in mass exposure cases. Courts encourage parties to settle, even in the absence of
reasonably complete scientific information about the causal impact of the disputed substance. See
Sc-lucK, supra note 184, at 143 (referring to Judge Weinstein's conviction that parties should settle
complex mass tort cases such as Agent Orange). According to a member of the plaintiffs' settlement
negotiation team, Judge Pointer strongly encouraged settlement in the breast implant litigation as early
as the beginning of 1994, when there was even less scientific research on the implants than there is
now. Telephone Conversation with Elizabeth J. Cabraser of Lieff, Cabraser, & Heimann (Winter
1994). The parties often do reach settlement, despite the inconclusiveness of scientific research. See
supra notes 99-111 and accompanying text (describing efforts to reach a silicone gel breast implant
global settlement).
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dynamic field that achieves definite conclusions slowly and without
dogmatic finality. In typical mass exposure cases, scientific research has
only reached tentative, often contradictory conclusions about causation.
The immaturity of scientific research, combined with the dynamic nature
of science, means that at the time of mass exposure litigation, a reasonable
factfinder will often be left in a state of strong uncertainty about general
causation: i.e., the factfinder will be unable to conclude that it is more
likely than not that a litigated substance is either safe or unsafe. In these
circumstances, whichever party bears the burden of proof on the question
of causation will lose not because the factfinder has good reason to
conclude that the litigated substance does or does not cause harm, but
because of a procedural default rule whose operation is not governed by the
truth about causation. The current tort system, however, cannot operate
effectively without substantively reliable information about the actual causal
powers of allegedly harmful substances. The real difficulty presented by
mass exposure litigation is recurrent strong uncertainty about causation, a
substantive problem that cannot be redressed by revising admissibility
standards or other procedural measures.
Because science cannot eliminate the problem of recurrent strong
uncertainty about general causation in mass exposure litigation, and because
science cannot tell law how to solve the prolem, scholars, courts, and
policymakers will have to look elsewhere for solutions. Before concluding
my discussion, I sketch some possible adjustments and alternatives to the
current tort system in order to identify some of the basic issues we would
need to resolve before we could decide how the legal system should
respond to strong recurrent uncertainty about causation.
The achievement of traditional tort goals depends heavily on reliable
information about causation. Implicit in the traditional approach is the idea
that the plaintiff's failure to meet the burden of proof on causation
generally arises from the fact that the defendant's conduct or product did
not cause the plaintiff's harm. I have argued that in cases. of strong
uncertainty about general causation, this correlation breaks down. In a
significant number of cases, scientific information about causation,
considered in full, will leave the reasonable factfinder strongly uncertain
about causation. But strong uncertainty does not necessarily correlate to
safety. In at least some cases of strong uncertainty at the time of litigation,
it will later be shown that the conduct or product at issue is in fact harmful
to human beings.
We need to mute the impact of strong uncertainty about causation in
order to minimize its interference with traditional tort goals. Alternatively,
we could rethink our goals, reformulating them so that certainty about
causation mattered less. I will survey three revisions of the current system,
each of which would reduce the role of certainty about causation. The first
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two suggestions are relatively minor modifications of the current system;
they are both indirect methods for pursuing traditional tort goals that skirt
the difficulties that strong uncertainty about causation creates for more
direct pursuit of these goals. The third proposal, sketched in the most
general terms, more drastically revises traditional goals. I present all three
alternatives to the current tort system quickly and generally. Before any
alternative could be selected for implementation, the details and effects of
each one would have to be considered much more closely. I offer these
lightly sketched alternatives to illustrate the ways in which redressing the
problem of recurrent strong uncertainty about causation pushes us to
reconsider traditional tort goals and how to achieve them.
One way to mute the impact of recurrent strong uncertainty about
causation would be to shift the burden of proof on cause-in-fact and on
breach or defect whenever the plaintiff could establish strong uncertainty
about general causation. Another option would be to split damages in
half-requiring the defendant to pay fifty percent of the plaintiff's losses-
in any case in which the plaintiff could establish strong uncertainty about
causation, and the defendant could not eliminate it. Either of these changes
to current rules would increase the incentive for the makers of potentially
toxic substances to investigate the substances' causal powers more carefully
before distributing them widely.
Recall that repeatedly absolving defendants of liability in the face of
strong uncertainty encourages defendants to market their products before
they have extensive information about the causal powers of their goods.
If strong uncertainty about general causation were an irremediable problem,
shifting the burden of proof or splitting damages would simply invert the
troublesome results produced by the current rules. Instead of erring on the
side of failing to allocate resources to those who have in fact been injured
by excessively risky behavior, we would err on the side of allocating
resources to those whose injuries have some other causal history. Instead
of sometimes mistakenly failing to require payment from defendants who
have indeed taken undue risks, we would sometimes mistakenly require
payment from defendants who have taken appropriate risks. And, instead
of failing in some instances to yoke excessive-risk-creators with victims of
their activities, we would sometimes wrongly yoke plaintiffs together with
defendants whose activities have no causal connection to the plaintiffs'
injuries. These outcomes would be as damaging to the achievement of tort
goals as current results are.
Strong uncertainty about general 'causation is not irremediable,
however. It is a problem in mass exposure litigation because of the timing
of such suits: they are put in motion and require resolution before there is
sufficient scientific data to determine reliably the causal powers of the
substances in question. If this timing problem could be eliminated or
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mitigated, so too would be the frequency of strong uncertainty about
general causation in mass exposure cases. For reasons I have already
given, it does not make sense to solve the timing problem by staying the
cases. 117 It might, however, be possible to solve it by ensuring that there
is more information available at the initiation of litigation. If manu-
facturers who could not eliminate strong uncertainty about the causal
powers of their products were held liable for injuries to members of the
exposed population, they would have an incentive to gather more extensive
information about general causation in advance of large-scale production
and marketing."' 8
Fuller investigation into the causal properties of their products before
production and marketing has costs, however. As the silicone breast
implant example demonstrates, it can take a long time to accumulate
significantly determinative scientific data, especially in mass exposure
cases. Motivating manufacturers to complete the process prior to
production and marketing will delay the availability of innovative,
potentially beneficial products. In some cases, it might not be worthwhile
for a manufacturer to research the causal powers of such products because
the possible fruits of marketing them lie too far in the future.
Worries about inhibiting innovation make splitting damages a more
attractive alternative than simply shifting the burden of proof on breach or
defect and cause-in-fact. By ameliorating the costs of being unable to
overcome strong uncertainty about causation, this proposal tempers the
incentive to always invest in extensive pre-marketing research. Choosing
between the alternatives of shifting the burden of proof and splitting the
damages would require investigation into the empirical effects of each and
a policy decision as to the relative merits of ensuring safety and dampening
innovation.
Because they would promote the acquisition of information about
causation, these modifications of current rules would indirectly foster tort
law's traditional deterrence goal-even though in some cases a defendant
who had in fact taken only appropriate risks, but was unable to establish
this, would end up paying half or all of a plaintiff's damages. None-
theless, shifting the burden and splitting the damages are ways to actually
decrease the instances of strong uncertainty by changing the incentives
created by the present system. Systematically fuller information about
causation would promote allocation of resources to those injured by overly
risky activity and more often yoke them with those who have engaged in
excessively risky injury-causing activity.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 182-86.
188. More information might preempt litigation altogether. If manufacturers had more information
about all of the causal consequences of their products, they would be more likely to take appropriate
risks in marketing them.
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A more drastic alternative to the current tort system's handling of
mass exposure cases would replace the system altogether, substituting for
it an administrative scheme that would allocate compensation on some
principle other than information about the causal genesis of injury (such as
need) and would regulate pre-market scientific research into the causal
powers of substances without presupposing the availability of a tort remedy
should the product later prove excessively risky. By detaching the
allocative function from the deterrence function, this sort of administrative
scheme drops tort's expressive goal of yoking undue-risk-takers who cause
injury with their victims. Under such a plan, we would not require
knowledge of the causal connections between risk-takers and injury victims
in order to link them together. In addition, by premising resource
allocation on some basis other than the causal history of a person's injuries,
such a scheme would not necessitate information about causation to
perform the allocative function. The deterrence mechanism in such a
system would, however, still call for information about causation, because
information about causation would be necessary in order to decide whether
a product posed sufficiently low risks to qualify for distribution. The
practical and political obstacles to this sort of program are daunting. As
a response to recurrent strong uncertainty about causation, however, an
administrative scheme holds some attractiveness because by abandoning
tort's expressive goal and transforming its allocative one, this kind of
program minimizes the significance of certainty about causation.
In muting the role of certainty about causation, each alternative to the
traditional tort system relaxes the aspiration to one or more of tort law's
traditional goals. Shifting the burden of proof to the defendant or splitting
damages in cases of strong uncertainty means that some defendants who
have not in fact created undue risks may incur all or some of the costs of
injuries that they have not caused. Likewise, some plaintiffs who have not
been the victims of overly risky activity may nonetheless receive money for
their injuries. Finally, when defendants compensate plaintiffs whom they
have not in fact injured, there is no expressive yoking of an excessively
risky actor with his victim. The regulatory-administrative scheme that I
sketched would eliminate the expressive function of the current tort system
entirely. It would also transform the basis for allocating resources to
injured people.
To decide whether any of these alternatives are acceptable or
desirable, we would have to settle certain basic questions. Should we
accomplish our goals with privatized mechanisms, such as tort liability, or
through governmental intervention, such as administrative regulation, or a
combination of the two approaches?189 Does it make sense to continue to
189. The debate over administrative versusjudicial risk regulationhas already begun. PeterHuber
and Kip Viscusi champion the abilities of regulatory agencies in this area. W. KiP Viscusi,
Texas Law Review
premise allocation on the causal history of injury rather than some other
criterion, such as the injured person's needs?"9  What is the proper
relationship between risk and innovation? How much should we encourage
or discourage the marketing of products prior to extensive scientific
investigation of their causal powers? What is the social significance and
value of yoking together injurers and victims? 9' How might this be
done other than through tort awards? Should a solution to the problem of
recurrent strong uncertainty about causation extend to all injuries and
activities or remain restricted to mass exposure episodes?"~
If the foregoing issues sound familiar, it is not surprising. Recurrent
strong uncertainty about causation strikes at the heart of tort law as we
know it, preventing the achievement of traditional goals and the vindication
of the commitments they reflect. Fully understood, the problem of
recurrent strong uncertainty 4uite naturally provokes us to revisit the most
fundamental questions in tort.
REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILrTY 171-72 (1991); Huber, supra note 29, at 305-37. For a defense of
judicial handling of risk and a critique of administrative alternatives, see Clayton P. Gillette & James
E. Krier, Risks, Courts, and Agencies, 138 PENN. L. REV. 1027 (1990). For a general discussion
comparing liability and regulation as approaches to risk, see SHAVELL, supra note 168, at 285-86.
190. Deciding who is entitled to resources under what circumstances is an old and vexed issue.
Proponents of tort reform have been too quick to assume the existence of social consensus on this issue.
See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 189, at 172 (simply presuming that "[w]hen compensation fails to
provide deterrence... [tihe appropriate level of compensation should not hinge on how the victim
contracted the disease or whether the illness is job-related or product-related" and that "the
compensation decision should depend instead on the effects of the disease on the victim's well-being
and the consequent need for income support"). Viscusi's assumptions seem ill-founded in light of our
long tradition of treating injury victims differently depending upon the causal origins of their problems
rather than on the basis of need.
191. Deciding the importance of linking injurers and victims financially would help us decide how
willing we should be to achieve our allocative goals through other means, such as first-party insurance
or broad-based social insurance. Commentators such as Viscusi who argue that we should replace mass
toxic tort litigation with a comprehensive social insurance program and a unified regulatory regime are
too quick to assume that we are prepared to surrender entirely the expressive goal of linking injurers
and victims. See Viscusf, supra note 189, at 169-74. Assessing the importance of yoking together
injurers and victims will probably call for a consideration of our reasons for doing so, which will in
turn require us to consider whether these reasons derive from a commitment to corrective justice,
however it is understood, or from some other source. See supra note 169.
192. In this Article, I have concentrated on strong uncertainty about general causation in mass
exposure litigation. The same problem arises in other tort contexts, especially medical malpractice
cases in which the causal effects of a certain treatment may be strongly uncertain. Steps taken to
respond to the problem of strong uncertainty about general causation might at least be appropriately
applied in other tort settings in which the problem appears.
